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Neutral monism

DOI
10.4324/9780415249126-N035-1
DOI: 10.4324/9780415249126-N035-1
Version: v1,  Published online: 1998
Retrieved September 21, 2019, from https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/neutral-monism/v-1

Article Summary

Neutral monism is a theory of the relation of mind and matter. It holds that both are complex constructions out of more primitive elements that are ‘neutral’ in the sense that they are neither mental nor material. Mind and matter, therefore, do not differ in the intrinsic nature of their constituents but in the manner in which the constituents are organized. The theory is monist only in claiming that all the basic elements of the world are of the same fundamental type (in contrast to mind–body dualism); it is, however, pluralist in that it admits a plurality of such elements (in contrast to metaphysical monism).

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Citing this article:
Griffin, Nicholas. Neutral monism, 1998, doi:10.4324/9780415249126-N035-1. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Taylor and Francis, https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/neutral-monism/v-1.
Copyright © 1998-2019 Routledge.

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