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Broome, J. (1999) ‘Normative Requirements’, Ratio
12: 398–419. (A trenchant account of formal normative requirements of coherence for action and belief.) |
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Darwall, S. (1983) Impartial Reason, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. (A critique of Humean theories of practical reason and statement of a Kantian alternative.) |
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Darwall, S. (1992) ‘Internalism and Agency’, Philosophical Perspectives
6: 155–174. (Argues that the internalism requirement is consistent with a Kantian theory of normative practical reasons.) |
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Darwall, S. (1997) ‘Self-Interest and Self-Concern’, in E.F.
Paul (ed.) Self-Interest, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Argues that the concept of welfare is normative for concern for a person for their own sake.) |
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Davidson, D. (1984) Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (See especially ‘Radical Interpretation’, pp. 125–39. Influential argument for the normativity of the mental.) |
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Foot, P. (1972) ‘Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives’, Philosophical Review
81: 305–316. (The classic critique of the claim that moral imperatives are categorical – that is, that they necessarily have normativity.) |
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Gibbard, A. (1990) Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Powerful statement of a norm-expressivist theory of normative judgement.) |
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Harman, G. (1977) The Nature of Morality, New York: Oxford University Press. (Now classic statement of the problem that ethical judgements seem not to be explicable as a response to ‘ethical facts’.) |
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Hume, D. (1739–40) Treatise of Human Nature, ed.
L.A.
Selby-Bigge and P.H.
Nidditch, 2nd edn, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978. (Book III provides the classical statement of the empirical naturalist approach to normativity.) |
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Kant, I. (1785) Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, in Gesammelte Schriften, ed.
Königlichen
Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin: Reimer, vol. 4, 1903; trans. and ed.
M.
Gregor, intro. C.
Korsgaard, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. (This is Kant’s classic introduction to ethics.) |
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Korsgaard, C. (1986) ‘Skepticism about Practical Reason’, Journal of Philosophy
83: 5–25. (Influential article that shows that Kantian approaches to practical reason are consistent with the requirement that reasons must be capable of motivating.) |
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Korsgaard, C. (1996) The Sources of Normativity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (A powerful and influential statement of a Kantian approach to practical normativity.) |
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Kripke, S. (1982) Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Oxford: Blackwell. (Very influential statement of the normativity of meaning, which provoked contemporary discussions about normativity in the philosophy of language.) |
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Mill, J.S. (1861) Utilitarianism, in J.M.
Robson (ed.) Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, London: Routledge, 1991, vol. 10, pp. 203–259. (Statement of the view that moral wrongness is conceptually related to blame and sanction.) |
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Pettit, P. and Smith, M. (1990) ‘Backgrounding Desire’, Philosophical Review
99: 565–592. (Argues that what we take to be reasons for acting are considerations, not about our desires, but about their objects.) |
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Scanlon, T. (1998) What We Owe to Each Other, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 41–55. (A critique of the idea that reasons for acting are based in desires.) |
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Skorupski, J. (2000) Ethical Explorations, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Argues that morality essentially concerns what justifies the attitude of blame.) |
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Smith, M. (1995) The Moral Problem, Oxford: Blackwell. (A penetrating discussion of the relation between normative and motivating reasons.) |
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Velleman, J.D. (1996) ‘The Possibility of Practical Reason’, Ethics
106: 707–726. (A penetrating discussion of the normative character of belief and comparison with the practical case.) |
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Williams, B.A.O. (1975) ‘Internal and External Reasons’, in R.
Harrison (ed.) Rational Action, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; also in B.A.O. Williams, Moral Luck, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981. (The classic statement of the Humean argument for the ‘internalist requirement’.) |