Normativity

References and further reading

	Broome, J. (1999) ‘Normative Requirements’, Ratio 12: 398–419. (A trenchant account of formal normative requirements of coherence for action and belief.)
	Darwall, S. (1983) Impartial Reason, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. (A critique of Humean theories of practical reason and statement of a Kantian alternative.)
	Darwall, S. (1992) ‘Internalism and Agency’, Philosophical Perspectives 6: 155–174. (Argues that the internalism requirement is consistent with a Kantian theory of normative practical reasons.)
	Darwall, S. (1997) ‘Self-Interest and Self-Concern’, in E.F. Paul (ed.) Self-Interest, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Argues that the concept of welfare is normative for concern for a person for their own sake.)
	Davidson, D. (1984) Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (See especially ‘Radical Interpretation’, pp. 125–39. Influential argument for the normativity of the mental.)
	Foot, P. (1972) ‘Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives’, Philosophical Review 81: 305–316. (The classic critique of the claim that moral imperatives are categorical – that is, that they necessarily have normativity.)
	Gibbard, A. (1990) Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Powerful statement of a norm-expressivist theory of normative judgement.)
	Harman, G. (1977) The Nature of Morality, New York: Oxford University Press. (Now classic statement of the problem that ethical judgements seem not to be explicable as a response to ‘ethical facts’.)
	Hume, D. (1739–40) Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge and P.H. Nidditch, 2nd edn, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978. (Book III provides the classical statement of the empirical naturalist approach to normativity.)
	Kant, I. (1785) Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, in Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Königlichen Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin: Reimer, vol. 4, 1903; trans. and ed. M. Gregor, intro. C. Korsgaard, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. (This is Kant’s classic introduction to ethics.)
	Korsgaard, C. (1986) ‘Skepticism about Practical Reason’, Journal of Philosophy 83: 5–25. (Influential article that shows that Kantian approaches to practical reason are consistent with the requirement that reasons must be capable of motivating.)
	Korsgaard, C. (1996) The Sources of Normativity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (A powerful and influential statement of a Kantian approach to practical normativity.)
	Kripke, S. (1982) Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Oxford: Blackwell. (Very influential statement of the normativity of meaning, which provoked contemporary discussions about normativity in the philosophy of language.)
	Mill, J.S. (1861) Utilitarianism, in J.M. Robson (ed.) Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, London: Routledge, 1991, vol. 10, pp. 203–259. (Statement of the view that moral wrongness is conceptually related to blame and sanction.)
	Pettit, P. and Smith, M. (1990) ‘Backgrounding Desire’, Philosophical Review 99: 565–592. (Argues that what we take to be reasons for acting are considerations, not about our desires, but about their objects.)
	Scanlon, T. (1998) What We Owe to Each Other, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 41–55. (A critique of the idea that reasons for acting are based in desires.)
	Skorupski, J. (2000) Ethical Explorations, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Argues that morality essentially concerns what justifies the attitude of blame.)
	Smith, M. (1995) The Moral Problem, Oxford: Blackwell. (A penetrating discussion of the relation between normative and motivating reasons.)
	Velleman, J.D. (1996) ‘The Possibility of Practical Reason’, Ethics 106: 707–726. (A penetrating discussion of the normative character of belief and comparison with the practical case.)
	Williams, B.A.O. (1975) ‘Internal and External Reasons’, in R. Harrison (ed.) Rational Action, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; also in B.A.O. Williams, Moral Luck, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981. (The classic statement of the Humean argument for the ‘internalist requirement’.)