DOI: 10.4324/9780415249126-L135-1
Version: v1,  Published online: 2001
Retrieved April 21, 2021, from

References and further reading

  • Broome, J. (1999) ‘Normative Requirements’, Ratio 12: 398–419.

    (A trenchant account of formal normative requirements of coherence for action and belief.)

  • Darwall, S. (1983) Impartial Reason, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

    (A critique of Humean theories of practical reason and statement of a Kantian alternative.)

  • Darwall, S. (1992) ‘Internalism and Agency’, Philosophical Perspectives 6: 155–174.

    (Argues that the internalism requirement is consistent with a Kantian theory of normative practical reasons.)

  • Darwall, S. (1997) ‘Self-Interest and Self-Concern’, in E.F. Paul (ed.) Self-Interest, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    (Argues that the concept of welfare is normative for concern for a person for their own sake.)

  • Davidson, D. (1984) Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

    (See especially ‘Radical Interpretation’, pp. 125–39. Influential argument for the normativity of the mental.)

  • Foot, P. (1972) ‘Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives’, Philosophical Review 81: 305–316.

    (The classic critique of the claim that moral imperatives are categorical – that is, that they necessarily have normativity.)

  • Gibbard, A. (1990) Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    (Powerful statement of a norm-expressivist theory of normative judgement.)

  • Harman, G. (1977) The Nature of Morality, New York: Oxford University Press.

    (Now classic statement of the problem that ethical judgements seem not to be explicable as a response to ‘ethical facts’.)

  • Hume, D. (1739–40) Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge and P.H. Nidditch, 2nd edn, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978.

    (Book III provides the classical statement of the empirical naturalist approach to normativity.)

  • Kant, I. (1785) Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, in Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Königlichen Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin: Reimer, vol. 4, 1903; trans. and ed. M. Gregor, intro. C. Korsgaard, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

    (This is Kant’s classic introduction to ethics.)

  • Korsgaard, C. (1986) ‘Skepticism about Practical Reason’, Journal of Philosophy 83: 5–25.

    (Influential article that shows that Kantian approaches to practical reason are consistent with the requirement that reasons must be capable of motivating.)

  • Korsgaard, C. (1996) The Sources of Normativity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    (A powerful and influential statement of a Kantian approach to practical normativity.)

  • Kripke, S. (1982) Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Oxford: Blackwell.

    (Very influential statement of the normativity of meaning, which provoked contemporary discussions about normativity in the philosophy of language.)

  • Mill, J.S. (1861) Utilitarianism, in J.M. Robson (ed.) Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, London: Routledge, 1991, vol. 10, pp. 203–259.

    (Statement of the view that moral wrongness is conceptually related to blame and sanction.)

  • Pettit, P. and Smith, M. (1990) ‘Backgrounding Desire’, Philosophical Review 99: 565–592.

    (Argues that what we take to be reasons for acting are considerations, not about our desires, but about their objects.)

  • Scanlon, T. (1998) What We Owe to Each Other, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 41–55.

    (A critique of the idea that reasons for acting are based in desires.)

  • Skorupski, J. (2000) Ethical Explorations, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    (Argues that morality essentially concerns what justifies the attitude of blame.)

  • Smith, M. (1995) The Moral Problem, Oxford: Blackwell.

    (A penetrating discussion of the relation between normative and motivating reasons.)

  • Velleman, J.D. (1996) ‘The Possibility of Practical Reason’, Ethics 106: 707–726.

    (A penetrating discussion of the normative character of belief and comparison with the practical case.)

  • Williams, B.A.O. (1975) ‘Internal and External Reasons’, in R. Harrison (ed.) Rational Action, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; also in B.A.O. Williams, Moral Luck, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.

    (The classic statement of the Humean argument for the ‘internalist requirement’.)

Citing this article:
Darwall, Stephen. Bibliography. Normativity, 2001, doi:10.4324/9780415249126-L135-1. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Taylor and Francis,
Copyright © 1998-2021 Routledge.

Related Articles