Descartes, R. (1641) Meditations, trans. E.S.
Haldane and G.R.T.
Ross, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969.
(Famous argument for the distinctness of mind and body, and for the immateriality of the soul.)
Garrett, B.J. (1990) ‘Personal Identity and Extrinsicness’, Philosophical Studies 59: 177–94.
Garrett, B.J. (1992) ‘Persons and Values’, Philosophical Quarterly 42: 337–45.
(These articles expand on the material in §§2 and 3.)
Hume, D. (1739) A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L.A.
Selby-Bigge, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978, 251–63.
(Classic statement of a sceptical position about the unity of personal identity.)
Lewis, D. (1976) ‘‘Survival and Identity’, in A.O.
Rorty (ed.) The Identities of Persons, Los Angeles: University of California Press.
(Lewis defends the multiple occupancy thesis criticized in §3.)
Locke, J. (1690) An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. J.
Yolton, London: Dent, 1961, bk II ch. xxvii.
(A subtle discussion of persons, thinking substances, and consciousness. Locke is a defender of a memory version of the Psychological Criterion of personal identity (see §1).)
Noonan, H. (1989) Personal Identity, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
(First-rate historical and contemporary survey.)
Nozick, R. (1981) Philosophical Explanations, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, ch. 2.
(Exciting discussion of the ‘best-candidate’ theory.)
Parfit, D. (1984) Reasons and Persons, Oxford: Oxford University Press, Part 3.
(An excellent introduction to many of the themes of this entry.)
Shoemaker, S. (1963) Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
(Influential discussion of issues concerning criteria of personal identity over time.)
Unger, P. (1992) Persons, Consciousness and Value, New York: Oxford University Press.
(Thorough and imaginative contemporary discussion. Defence of the physical criterion of personal identity.)
Wiggins, D. (1980) Sameness and Substance, Oxford: Blackwell, ch. 6.
(Contains doubts about the possibility of the fission of persons.)
Williams, B. (1973) ‘‘The Self and the Future’, in B.
Williams (ed.) Problems of the Self, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
(Discussion of one famous thought experiment which seems to support the psychological criterion when described in one way, and to support the physical criterion when described in another way.)