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Baker, L. (2000) Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (A detailed defence of the constitution theory as a general metaphysical view and as it applies to persons.) |
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DeGrazia, D. (2005) Human Identity and Bioethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (A complex account of personal identity applied to problems in bioethics.) |
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Dennett, D. (1992)‘The Self as a Center of Narrative Gravity’, in Frank S.
Kessel, Pamela M.
Cole and Dale L.
Johnson (ed.) Self and Consciousness: Multiple Perspectives, Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 103–115. (An empirically inspired narrative account of the self.) |
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Korsgaard, C. (1989) ‘Personal Identity and the Unity of Agency: A Kantian Reply to Parfit’, Philosophy & Public Affairs
18 (2): 101–132. (An original and important argument for defining personal identity in terms of agential unity.) |
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Lamarque, P. (2007)‘On the Distance between Literary Narratives and Real-Life Narratives’, in Daniel
Hutto (ed.) Narrative and Understanding Persons, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 117–132. (Argues that narrative theorists exaggerate the structural connections between life and literature.) |
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Lewis, D. (1976)‘Survival and Identity’, in A. O.
Rorty (ed.) The Identities of Persons, Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 17–40. (A fairly technical account of the four-dimensionalist response to the fission case.) |
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Locke, J. (1689) An Essay concerning Human Understanding, ed.
P.
Nidditch, Oxford: Clarendon Press,1975. (II.xxvii contains the classic statement of the modern problem of personal identity and the original statement of central insights behind the psychological approach.) |
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Martin, R. and Barresi, J. (2003) Personal Identity, Malden, MA: Blackwell. (An extremely useful collection of recent essays on personal identity.) |
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McMahan, J. (2002) The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life, New York: Oxford University Press. (A meticulous argument for a minimalist account of identity and its application to difficult ethical problems.) |
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Noonan, H. (1989) Personal Identity, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul; 2nd edn 2003. (An important survey of the major issues in the personal identity debate.) |
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Olson, E. (1997) The Human Animal: Personal Identity without Psychology, New York: Oxford University Press. (A clear and well-argued defence of animalism.) |
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Parfit, D. (1984) Reasons and Persons, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (A groundbreaking work that reviews the major positions in the personal-identity debate, offers radical new positions and explores their implications for ethics.) |
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Perry, J. (1972)‘Can the Self Divide?’, Journal of Philosophy
69 (16): 463–488. (A fairly technical response to the fission case.) |
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Perry, J. (1975) Personal Identity, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. (An important and useful collection of early papers in the personal-identity debate.) |
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Perry, J. (1976)‘The Importance of Being Identical’, in A.
Rorty (ed.) The Identities of Persons, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. (A defence of the psychological approach against the argument that it cannot explain future-directed self-concern.) |
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Perry, J. (1978) A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality, Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company. (An introduction to the personal-identity debate in dialogue form.) |
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Ricoeur, P. (1990)) Soi-méme comme un autre, Paris: Éditions du Seuil; trans.
Kathleen
Blamey, Oneself as Another, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1992. (A detailed hermeneutical narrative account.) |
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Rorty, A. (1976) The Identities of Persons, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. (An important anthology of classic papers on personal identity.) |
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Rovane, C. (1998) The Bounds of Agency: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (A revisionary account that defines identity in terms of the unity of a rational rather than phenomenological point of view.) |
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Schechtman, M. (1996) The Constitution of Selves, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. (Argues that the narrative approach is superior to the psychological continuity theory.) |
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Shoemaker, D. (2007)‘Personal Identity and Practical Concerns’, Mind
116 (462): 317–357. (An article exploring the complexity of the relations between personal identity and the practical.) |
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Shoemaker, S. (1984)‘Personal Identity: A Materialist’s Account’, in S.
Shoemaker and R.
Swinburne (eds) Personal Identity, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 67–138. (A defence of a version of the psychological approach.) |
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Strawson, G. (2004) ‘Against Narrativity’, Ratio
17 (4): 428–452. (A powerful attack on narrative views of self.) |
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Taylor, C. (1989) Sources of the Self, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press. (A sweeping historical discussion of the notion of personal identity and defence of the hermeneutical narrative view.) |
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Unger, P. (1990) Identity, Consciousness, and Value, New York: Oxford University Press. (A thoughtful and wide-ranging argument for a minimalist view of identity.) |
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Wilkes, K. (1988) Real People: Personal Identity without Thought Experiments, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (A compelling argument against the use of science-fiction thought experiments in the investigation of personal identity.) |
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Williams, B. (1973)‘The Self and the Future’, inProblems of the Self: Philosophical Papers 1956–1972, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (A collection of original and thoughtful papers about self and identity.) |