Personal identity

DOI: 10.4324/9780415249126-V024-2
Version: v2,  Published online: 2011
Retrieved June 13, 2024, from

References and further reading

  • Baker, L. (2000) Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    (A detailed defence of the constitution theory as a general metaphysical view and as it applies to persons.)

  • DeGrazia, D. (2005) Human Identity and Bioethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    (A complex account of personal identity applied to problems in bioethics.)

  • Dennett, D. (1992)‘The Self as a Center of Narrative Gravity’, in Frank S. Kessel, Pamela M. Cole and Dale L. Johnson (ed.) Self and Consciousness: Multiple Perspectives, Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 103–115.

    (An empirically inspired narrative account of the self.)

  • Korsgaard, C. (1989) ‘Personal Identity and the Unity of Agency: A Kantian Reply to Parfit’, Philosophy & Public Affairs 18 (2): 101–132.

    (An original and important argument for defining personal identity in terms of agential unity.)

  • Lamarque, P. (2007)‘On the Distance between Literary Narratives and Real-Life Narratives’, in Daniel Hutto (ed.) Narrative and Understanding Persons, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 117–132.

    (Argues that narrative theorists exaggerate the structural connections between life and literature.)

  • Lewis, D. (1976)‘Survival and Identity’, in A. O. Rorty (ed.) The Identities of Persons, Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 17–40.

    (A fairly technical account of the four-dimensionalist response to the fission case.)

  • Locke, J. (1689) An Essay concerning Human Understanding, ed. P. Nidditch, Oxford: Clarendon Press,1975.

    (II.xxvii contains the classic statement of the modern problem of personal identity and the original statement of central insights behind the psychological approach.)

  • Martin, R. and Barresi, J. (2003) Personal Identity, Malden, MA: Blackwell.

    (An extremely useful collection of recent essays on personal identity.)

  • McMahan, J. (2002) The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life, New York: Oxford University Press.

    (A meticulous argument for a minimalist account of identity and its application to difficult ethical problems.)

  • Noonan, H. (1989) Personal Identity, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul; 2nd edn 2003.

    (An important survey of the major issues in the personal identity debate.)

  • Olson, E. (1997) The Human Animal: Personal Identity without Psychology, New York: Oxford University Press.

    (A clear and well-argued defence of animalism.)

  • Parfit, D. (1984) Reasons and Persons, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    (A groundbreaking work that reviews the major positions in the personal-identity debate, offers radical new positions and explores their implications for ethics.)

  • Perry, J. (1972)‘Can the Self Divide?’, Journal of Philosophy 69 (16): 463–488.

    (A fairly technical response to the fission case.)

  • Perry, J. (1975) Personal Identity, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

    (An important and useful collection of early papers in the personal-identity debate.)

  • Perry, J. (1976)‘The Importance of Being Identical’, in A. Rorty (ed.) The Identities of Persons, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

    (A defence of the psychological approach against the argument that it cannot explain future-directed self-concern.)

  • Perry, J. (1978) A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality, Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company.

    (An introduction to the personal-identity debate in dialogue form.)

  • Ricoeur, P. (1990)) Soi-méme comme un autre, Paris: Éditions du Seuil; trans. Kathleen Blamey, Oneself as Another, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1992.

    (A detailed hermeneutical narrative account.)

  • Rorty, A. (1976) The Identities of Persons, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

    (An important anthology of classic papers on personal identity.)

  • Rovane, C. (1998) The Bounds of Agency: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

    (A revisionary account that defines identity in terms of the unity of a rational rather than phenomenological point of view.)

  • Schechtman, M. (1996) The Constitution of Selves, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

    (Argues that the narrative approach is superior to the psychological continuity theory.)

  • Shoemaker, D. (2007)‘Personal Identity and Practical Concerns’, Mind 116 (462): 317–357.

    (An article exploring the complexity of the relations between personal identity and the practical.)

  • Shoemaker, S. (1984)‘Personal Identity: A Materialist’s Account’, in S. Shoemaker and R. Swinburne (eds) Personal Identity, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 67–138.

    (A defence of a version of the psychological approach.)

  • Strawson, G. (2004) ‘Against Narrativity’, Ratio 17 (4): 428–452.

    (A powerful attack on narrative views of self.)

  • Taylor, C. (1989) Sources of the Self, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.

    (A sweeping historical discussion of the notion of personal identity and defence of the hermeneutical narrative view.)

  • Unger, P. (1990) Identity, Consciousness, and Value, New York: Oxford University Press.

    (A thoughtful and wide-ranging argument for a minimalist view of identity.)

  • Wilkes, K. (1988) Real People: Personal Identity without Thought Experiments, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

    (A compelling argument against the use of science-fiction thought experiments in the investigation of personal identity.)

  • Williams, B. (1973)‘The Self and the Future’, inProblems of the Self: Philosophical Papers 1956–1972, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    (A collection of original and thoughtful papers about self and identity.)

Citing this article:
Schechtman, Marya. Bibliography. Personal identity, 2011, doi:10.4324/9780415249126-V024-2. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Taylor and Francis,
Copyright © 1998-2024 Routledge.

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