Qualia

References and further reading

	Block, N. (1978) ‘‘Troubles with Functionalism’, repr. in D. Rosenthal (ed.) The Nature of Mind, New York: Oxford University Press, 1991. (Describes and raises objections to functionalism; home of the ‘absent qualia’ objection.)
	Dennett, D. (1991) Consciousness Explained, Boston, MA: Little, Brown. (Argues for eliminativism about qualia, and challenges the view that there is a unified stream of consciousness.)
	Hill, C. (1991) Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism, New York: Cambridge University Press. (Argues for a type-identity thesis for sensations.)
	Jackson, F. (1982) ‘‘Epiphenomenal Qualia’, repr. in W.G. Lycan, Mind and Cognition, Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1990. (Develops a version of the knowledge argument against a physicalistic reduction of qualia; see §2.)
	Kripke, S. (1970) from ‘Naming and Necessity’, repr. in D. Rosenthal (ed.) The Nature of Minds, New York: Oxford University Press. (Presents the neo-Cartesian argument against a physicalist reduction of qualia mentioned in §2.)
	Levin, J. (1991) ‘Analytic Functionalism and the Reduction of Phenomenal States’, in Philosophical Studies 61: 211–38. (Expands on the material in §2.)
	Levine, J. (1983) ‘Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64: 4. (Introduces the explanatory gap argument, discussed in §2.)
	Lewis, D. (1972) ‘‘Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications’, repr. in D. Rosenthal (ed.) The Nature of Minds, New York: Oxford University Press, 1991. (Argues for the equivalence of qualitative and functional concepts; see §2.)
	Lewis, D. (1988) ‘‘What Experience Teaches’, repr. in W.G. Lycan, Mind and Cognition, Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. (Develops the view that what is gained by having new experiences are new abilities rather than knowledge of facts; see §2.)
	Loar, B. (1990) ‘‘Phenomenal States’, in J. Tomberlin (ed.) Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 4, Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview. (Introduces and develops the view discussed in §2.)
	Nagel, T. (1974) ‘‘What is it Like to Be a Bat?’, repr. in D. Rosenthal (ed.) The Nature of Mind, New York: Oxford University Press, 1991. (Develops a version of the knowledge argument against physicalism, discussed in §2.)
	Rosenthal, D. (1991) The Nature of Mind, New York: Oxford University Press. (Anthology includes a number of articles in this list, and many others relevant to these issues.)
	Searle, J. (1992) The Rediscovery of the Mind, Cambridge, MA: MIT. (Argues that intentional states must have qualitative character.)
	Shoemaker, S. (1990) ‘‘First-Person Access’, in J. Tomberlin, (ed.) Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 4, Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview. (Develops views about self-knowledge discussed in §3.)