Reference

References and further reading

	Burge, T. (1979) ‘Individualism and the Mental’, in P.A. French, T.E. Uehling, Jr. and H.K. Wettstein (eds) Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. 10, Studies in the Philosophy of Mind, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. (Argues that reference for many terms is determined by the social context; referred to in §3.)
	Chastain, C. (1975) ‘Reference and Context’, in K. Gunderson (ed.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 7, Language, Mind and Knowledge, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. (A long paper on singular reference and anaphora. A source for the view that indefinite descriptions have two uses.)
	Davidson, D. (1984) Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 215–225. (Argues against the need for, and possibility of, theories of reference; referred to in §9.)
	Devitt, M. (1981) Designation, New York: Columbia University Press. (Develops a causal-historical theory of proper names, demonstratives and referential descriptions along naturalistic lines; referred to in §§4 and 8.)
	Devitt, M. and Sterelny, K. (1998) Language and Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Language, Oxford: Blackwell, 2nd edn. (Provides an introductory discussion of reference and of its significance for issues such as realism. Also includes an annotated guide to further reading.)
	Donnellan, K.S. (1966) ‘Reference and Definite Descriptions’, Philosophical Review 75: 281–304. (Influential work proposing a distinction between referential and attributive descriptions and criticizing Russell and Strawson; referred to in §6.)
	Donnellan, K.S. (1972) ‘Proper Names and Identifying Descriptions’, in D. Davidson and G. Harman (eds) The Semantics of Natural Language, Dordrecht: Reidel. (Criticizes the description theory of proper names and proposes a historical theory; referred to in §§2 and 4.)
	Dretske, F. (1981) Knowledge and the Flow of Information, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Most influential proposal of a reliabilist theory of reference; referred to in §8.)
	Dummett, M.A.E. (1973) ‘Appendix: Note on an Attempted Refutation of Frege’, in Frege: Philosophy of Language, London: Duckworth. (A defence of a Fregean view of proper names from Kripke’s criticisms; referred to in §2.)
	Evans, G. (1982) The Varieties of Reference, ed. J. McDowell, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Defends ‘Russell’s Principle’ that to think about an object a person must know which object is in question.)
	Evans, G. (1985) Collected Papers, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Chapters 4, 5 and 8 argue for the view that some anaphoric pronouns are ‘E-type’ rather than bound; referred to in §7.)
	Field, H. (1973) ‘Theory Change and the Indeterminacy of Reference’, Journal of Philosophy 70: 462–481. (Argues that the reference of scientific terms is sometimes indeterminate and that they should be seen as ‘partially referring’; referred to in §9.)
	Fodor, J.A. (1990) A Theory of Content and Other Essays, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Chapters 3 and 4 propose a reliabilist theory of reference appealing to ‘asymmetric counterfactuals’; referred to in §8.)
	Frege, G. (1893) ‘On Sense and Reference’, in P. Geach and M. Black (eds) Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, Oxford: Blackwell, 1952. (Classic work raising the problem of identity statements for a Millian theory of proper names and proposing the theory that names have ‘senses’; referred to in §1.)
	Geach, P. (1962) Reference and Generality, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. (Argues that all anaphoric pronouns are either like bound variables or are ‘pronouns of laziness’; referred to in §7.)
	Grice, H.P. (1989) Studies in the Way of Words, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Proposes the distinction between speaker meaning and semantic meaning that has been influential in discussions of definite descriptions; referred to in §6.)
	Husserl, E. (1900–1) Logical Investigations, trans. J.N. Findley, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970, part 1, §26; part 6, §§1–5. (Proposes a theory of demonstratives based on perception; referred to in §5.)
	Kaplan, D. (1989) ‘Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics, and Epistemology of Demonstratives and Other Indexicals’, in J. Almog, J. Perry and H. Wettstein (eds) Themes from Kaplan, New York: Oxford University Press. (Influential work arguing that the reference of a demonstrative is ‘direct’ not via a Fregean sense; referred to in §5.)
	Kripke, S.A. (1980) Naming and Necessity, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Very influential work criticizing the description theory of proper names and natural-kind terms and proposing a causal ‘picture’; first presented in lectures in the late 1960s; referred to in §§2–4.)
	Kripke, S.A. (1982) Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language: An Elementary Exposition, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Argues from a consideration of rule-following that the meanings and references of terms are not determinate; referred to in §9.)
	Kuhn, T.S. (1970) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 2nd edn. (In this brilliant work on scientific change, a description theory of reference leads to antirealist constructivism; referred to in §9.)
	Marcus, R.B. (1961) ‘Modalities and Intensional Language’, Synthèse 13: 303–322. (Argues that proper names are Millian and that true identity statements involving them are always necessary; referred to in §2.)
	Millikan, R. (1984) Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (The most detailed proposal of a teleological theory of reference; referred to in §8.)
	Mill, J.S. (1843) A System of Logic, London: Longmans, 1867. (Book 1, Chapter 2 proposes his theory of both ‘general and singular’ names – referred to in §1.)
	Neale, S. (1990) Descriptions, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (A thorough defence of the Russellian approach to definite descriptions. Includes an excellent bibliography.)
	Papineau, D. (1987) Reality and Representation, Oxford: Blackwell. (Proposes a teleological theory of reference.)
	Putnam, H. (1975) Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, vol. 2, 196–290. (Very influential argument against description theories and for causal theories of natural-kind and other terms; referred to in §§3 and 4.)
	Putnam, H. (1983) Realism and Reason: Philosophical Papers, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, vol. 3, 1–25. (Presents his model-theoretic argument that reference is indeterminate; referred to in §9.)
	Quine, W.V. (1960) Word and Object, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Section 12 argues for the inscrutability of reference in the context of arguing for the indeterminacy of translation; referred to in §9.)
	Reichenbach, H. (1947) Elements of Logic, London: Macmillan. (Section 50 proposes a theory of ‘token-reflexive’ words; referred to in §5.)
	Russell, B. (1905) ‘On Denoting’, Mind 14: 479–493. (A classic paper proposing his famous theory of descriptions; referred to in §6)
	Russell, B. (1911) ‘Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description’, in Mysticism and Logic, London: Allen & Unwin, 1917. (A classic source for the description theory of proper names; referred to in §1.)
	Russell, B. (1912) The Problems of Philosophy, London: Oxford University Press, 1959. (Chapter 5 gives a brief and accessible account of Russell’s theory of proper names and descriptions.)
	Russell, B. (1918) ‘The Philosophy of Logical Atomism’, in R.C. Marsh (ed.) Logic and Knowledge, London: Allen & Unwin, 1956. (Discusses the referential properties of many terms, including ‘egocentric particulars’; referred to in §§1, 5 and 6.)
	Searle, J. (1958) ‘Proper Names’, Mind 67: 166–173. (A very clear presentation of a cluster description theory of names; referred to in §1.)
	Strawson, P.F. (1950) ‘On Referring’, Mind 59: 320–344. (A critique of Russell’s theory of descriptions.)
	Strawson, P.F. (1959) Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, London: Methuen, 180–183, 190–194. (Proposes a cluster description theory of names; referred to in §1.)