Respect for persons

References and further reading

	Cranor, C. (1975) ‘Toward a Theory of Respect for Persons’, American Philosophical Quarterly 12: 309–319. (Reviews previous accounts, offers a complex analysis of respect, and argues that respect for persons alone cannot be an adequate basis for moral theory.)
	Darwall, S. (1977) ‘Two Kinds of Respect’, Ethics 88: 36–49. (A discussion of the distinction between ‘appraisal respect’ and ‘recognition respect’.)
	Dillon, R. (1992) ‘Respect and Care: Toward Moral Integration’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22: 105–131. (A discussion of how moral considerations of respect for persons might be combined with a feminist ethics of care.)
	Donagan, A. (1977) The Theory of Morality, Chicago, IL and London: University of Chicago Press. (A systematic attempt to derive moral duties from a basic and comprehensive principle of respect for persons.)
	Downie, R.S. and Telfer, E. (1969) Respect for Persons, London: Allen & Unwin. (Develops the idea of the supreme worth of the individual person as the basis for a comprehensive requirement of respect.)
	Frankena, W.E. (1986) ‘The Ethics of Respect for Persons’, Philosophical Topics 14: 149–167. (A clear critique of the project of grounding all of morality on respect for persons.)
	Fried, C. (1978) Right and Wrong, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Employs the idea of respect for persons in discussions of many particular moral problems.)
	Green, O.H. (1982) Respect for Persons, Tulane Studies in Philosophy, vol. 31, New Orleans, LA: Tulane University. (A collection of twelve short essays on respect for persons in relation to moral theory, self-respect, and various moral problems.)
	Hill, T.E., Jr (1993) ‘Donagan’s Kant’, Ethics 104: 22–52. (A comparative and critical discussion of Donagan and Kant on respect for persons and humanity as an end in itself.)
	Hudson, S.D. (1980) ‘The Nature of Respect’, Social Theory and Practice 6: 69–90. (A detailed analysis of four kinds of respect.)
	Kant, I. (1785) Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, trans. with notes by H.J. Paton, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (originally The Moral Law), London: Hutchinson, 1948; repr. New York: Harper & Row, 1964. (Kant’s classic, but not easy, work on the foundations of ethics, important here especially for its discussion of humanity as an end in itself.)
	Kant, I. (1788) Critik der practischen Vernunft, trans. L.W. Beck, Critique of Practical Reason, New York: Macmillan, 1965; 3rd edn, 1993. (Another important but difficult work on the foundations of morals, with an extended treatment of respect for moral law, which underlies respect for persons.)
	Kant, I. (1797) Die Metaphysik der Sitten, trans M.J. Gregor, The Metaphysics of Morals, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. (Kant’s late work on the intermediate principles of morals, including quite readable sections on respect for others, respect in friendship, and, under ‘duties to oneself’, self-respect.)
	Rawls, J. (1971) A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Now a classic of moral and political theory, this work argues that self-respect is a primary good better secured by Rawls’ two principles of justice than by utilitarian principles.)
	Sachs, D. (1981) ‘How to Distinguish Self-Respect from Self-Esteem’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 10 (4): 346–360. (A subtle account of self-respect and ways in which it differs from self-esteem.)