Respect for persons

DOI: 10.4324/9780415249126-L084-1
Version: v1,  Published online: 1998
Retrieved September 30, 2022, from

References and further reading

  • Cranor, C. (1975) ‘Toward a Theory of Respect for Persons’, American Philosophical Quarterly 12: 309–319.

    (Reviews previous accounts, offers a complex analysis of respect, and argues that respect for persons alone cannot be an adequate basis for moral theory.)

  • Darwall, S. (1977) ‘Two Kinds of Respect’, Ethics 88: 36–49.

    (A discussion of the distinction between ‘appraisal respect’ and ‘recognition respect’.)

  • Dillon, R. (1992) ‘Respect and Care: Toward Moral Integration’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22: 105–131.

    (A discussion of how moral considerations of respect for persons might be combined with a feminist ethics of care.)

  • Donagan, A. (1977) The Theory of Morality, Chicago, IL and London: University of Chicago Press.

    (A systematic attempt to derive moral duties from a basic and comprehensive principle of respect for persons.)

  • Downie, R.S. and Telfer, E. (1969) Respect for Persons, London: Allen & Unwin.

    (Develops the idea of the supreme worth of the individual person as the basis for a comprehensive requirement of respect.)

  • Frankena, W.E. (1986) ‘The Ethics of Respect for Persons’, Philosophical Topics 14: 149–167.

    (A clear critique of the project of grounding all of morality on respect for persons.)

  • Fried, C. (1978) Right and Wrong, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    (Employs the idea of respect for persons in discussions of many particular moral problems.)

  • Green, O.H. (1982) Respect for Persons, Tulane Studies in Philosophy, vol. 31, New Orleans, LA: Tulane University.

    (A collection of twelve short essays on respect for persons in relation to moral theory, self-respect, and various moral problems.)

  • Hill, T.E., Jr (1993) ‘Donagan’s Kant’, Ethics 104: 22–52.

    (A comparative and critical discussion of Donagan and Kant on respect for persons and humanity as an end in itself.)

  • Hudson, S.D. (1980) ‘The Nature of Respect’, Social Theory and Practice 6: 69–90.

    (A detailed analysis of four kinds of respect.)

  • Kant, I. (1785) Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, trans. with notes by H.J. Paton, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (originally The Moral Law), London: Hutchinson, 1948; repr. New York: Harper & Row, 1964.

    (Kant’s classic, but not easy, work on the foundations of ethics, important here especially for its discussion of humanity as an end in itself.)

  • Kant, I. (1788) Critik der practischen Vernunft, trans. L.W. Beck, Critique of Practical Reason, New York: Macmillan, 1965; 3rd edn, 1993.

    (Another important but difficult work on the foundations of morals, with an extended treatment of respect for moral law, which underlies respect for persons.)

  • Kant, I. (1797) Die Metaphysik der Sitten, trans M.J. Gregor, The Metaphysics of Morals, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

    (Kant’s late work on the intermediate principles of morals, including quite readable sections on respect for others, respect in friendship, and, under ‘duties to oneself’, self-respect.)

  • Rawls, J. (1971) A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    (Now a classic of moral and political theory, this work argues that self-respect is a primary good better secured by Rawls’ two principles of justice than by utilitarian principles.)

  • Sachs, D. (1981) ‘How to Distinguish Self-Respect from Self-Esteem’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 10 (4): 346–360.

    (A subtle account of self-respect and ways in which it differs from self-esteem.)

Citing this article:
Hill, Thomas E.. Bibliography. Respect for persons, 1998, doi:10.4324/9780415249126-L084-1. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Taylor and Francis,
Copyright © 1998-2022 Routledge.

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