Social epistemology

References and further reading

	Annis, D. (1978) ‘A contextualist theory of justification’, American Philosophical Quarterly 15: 213–219. (Argues that justification is relative to an audience and to the social role of the subject.)
	Brown, J.R. (1987) The Rational and the Social, London: Routledge. (Critical review of the philosophical claims of the ‘strong programme’ in the sociology of scientific knowledge.)
	Coady, C.A.J. (1991) Testimony: A Philosophical Study, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Comprehensive historical and philosophical study of epistemological issues about testimony.)
	Craig, E. (1990) Knowledge and the State of Nature: An Essay in Conceptual Synthesis, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Explains various features of the concept of knowledge by deriving it from the notion of a good informant.)
	Gilbert, M. (1989) On Social Facts, London: Routledge. (The most systematic account of collective concepts yet attempted, with an extensive discussion of common knowledge and group belief.)
	Goldman, A.I. (1992) Liaisons: Philosophy Meets the Cognitive and Social Sciences, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Includes articles on epistemic paternalism and – with M. Shaked – on the role of credit in fostering true belief in science.)
	Hume, D. (1748) An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, in Hume’s Enquiries, ed. P.H. Nidditch and L.A. Selby-Bigge, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975. (The discussion of testimony appears in §88.)
	Kitcher, P. (1990) ‘The division of cognitive labor’, Journal of Philosophy 87: 5–22. (Argues that pursuing lines of inquiry based on improbable theories can foster the cognitive goals of science.)
	Latour, B. (1987) Science in Action, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Argues for the first kind of social constructivism defined in §5 above.)
	Lehrer, K. and Wagner, C. (1981) Rational Consensus in Science and Society, Dordrecht: Reidel. (Contains an account of the conditions in which an individual is committed to accepting the consensus of a group.)
	Locke, J. (1689) An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. A.C. Fraser, New York: Dover, 2 vols, 1959. (The remarks about testimony appear at Book I, page 58 and Book IV, chapters 15 and 16, §§10 and 11.)
	Longino, H. (1990) Science as Social Knowledge, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (A multiperspectival account of scientific knowledge.)
	Peirce, C.S. (1955) ‘The fixation of belief’, in Philosophical Writings of Peirce, ed. J. Buchler, New York: Dover. (The argument for common relief from doubt as the aim of proper method appears on pages 12–13.)
	Reid, T. (1785) Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, ed. B. Brody, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1969. (The material on testimony appears in Essay VI, chapter 5.)
	Rouse, J. (1987) Knowledge and Power: Toward a Political Philosophy of Science, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. (Defends the first two versions of social constructivism about knowledge mentioned in §5 above.)
	Schmitt, F.F. (1987) Synthèse 62, special issue on social epistemology. (Collection of articles on diverse topics in social epistemology.)
	Schmitt, F.F. (1994) Socializing Epistemology, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. (An anthology containing articles on topics in all branches of social epistemology, with an introduction that expands on §§1 and 5 of this entry and an extensive bibliography.)
	Sextus Empiricus (c. 200) Outlines of Pyrrhonism, in Sextus Empiricus, vol. 1, trans. R.G. Bury, Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1933. (The maxim of epistemic parity among persons is assumed in the second through fifth and in the tenth modes in book I, chapter 14.)
	Solomon, M. (1994) ‘Social empiricism’, Nous 28: 325–343. (Argues that biases resulting from scientists’ training and professional preoccupations may foster the cognitive goal of empirical adequacy.)
	Wittgenstein, L. (1969) On Certainty, ed. G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright, trans. D. Paul and G.E.M. Anscombe, New York: Harper. (Suggests that beliefs or claims are justified on the basis of communally accepted propositions.)