Print

Social epistemology

DOI
10.4324/9780415249126-P046-1
Versions
DOI: 10.4324/9780415249126-P046-1
Version: v1,  Published online: 1998
Retrieved April 01, 2020, from https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/social-epistemology/v-1

References and further reading

  • Annis, D. (1978) ‘A contextualist theory of justification’, American Philosophical Quarterly 15: 213–219.

    (Argues that justification is relative to an audience and to the social role of the subject.)

  • Brown, J.R. (1987) The Rational and the Social, London: Routledge.

    (Critical review of the philosophical claims of the ‘strong programme’ in the sociology of scientific knowledge.)

  • Coady, C.A.J. (1991) Testimony: A Philosophical Study, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    (Comprehensive historical and philosophical study of epistemological issues about testimony.)

  • Craig, E. (1990) Knowledge and the State of Nature: An Essay in Conceptual Synthesis, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

    (Explains various features of the concept of knowledge by deriving it from the notion of a good informant.)

  • Gilbert, M. (1989) On Social Facts, London: Routledge.

    (The most systematic account of collective concepts yet attempted, with an extensive discussion of common knowledge and group belief.)

  • Goldman, A.I. (1992) Liaisons: Philosophy Meets the Cognitive and Social Sciences, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    (Includes articles on epistemic paternalism and – with M. Shaked – on the role of credit in fostering true belief in science.)

  • Hume, D. (1748) An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, in Hume’s Enquiries, ed. P.H. Nidditch and L.A. Selby-Bigge, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975.

    (The discussion of testimony appears in §88.)

  • Kitcher, P. (1990) ‘The division of cognitive labor’, Journal of Philosophy 87: 5–22.

    (Argues that pursuing lines of inquiry based on improbable theories can foster the cognitive goals of science.)

  • Latour, B. (1987) Science in Action, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    (Argues for the first kind of social constructivism defined in §5 above.)

  • Lehrer, K. and Wagner, C. (1981) Rational Consensus in Science and Society, Dordrecht: Reidel.

    (Contains an account of the conditions in which an individual is committed to accepting the consensus of a group.)

  • Locke, J. (1689) An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. A.C. Fraser, New York: Dover, 2 vols, 1959.

    (The remarks about testimony appear at Book I, page 58 and Book IV, chapters 15 and 16, §§10 and 11.)

  • Longino, H. (1990) Science as Social Knowledge, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

    (A multiperspectival account of scientific knowledge.)

  • Peirce, C.S. (1955) ‘The fixation of belief’, in Philosophical Writings of Peirce, ed. J. Buchler, New York: Dover.

    (The argument for common relief from doubt as the aim of proper method appears on pages 12–13.)

  • Reid, T. (1785) Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, ed. B. Brody, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1969.

    (The material on testimony appears in Essay VI, chapter 5.)

  • Rouse, J. (1987) Knowledge and Power: Toward a Political Philosophy of Science, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

    (Defends the first two versions of social constructivism about knowledge mentioned in §5 above.)

  • Schmitt, F.F. (1987) Synthèse 62, special issue on social epistemology.

    (Collection of articles on diverse topics in social epistemology.)

  • Schmitt, F.F. (1994) Socializing Epistemology, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

    (An anthology containing articles on topics in all branches of social epistemology, with an introduction that expands on §§1 and 5 of this entry and an extensive bibliography.)

  • Sextus Empiricus (c. 200) Outlines of Pyrrhonism, in Sextus Empiricus, vol. 1, trans. R.G. Bury, Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1933.

    (The maxim of epistemic parity among persons is assumed in the second through fifth and in the tenth modes in book I, chapter 14.)

  • Solomon, M. (1994) ‘Social empiricism’, Nous 28: 325–343.

    (Argues that biases resulting from scientists’ training and professional preoccupations may foster the cognitive goal of empirical adequacy.)

  • Wittgenstein, L. (1969) On Certainty, ed. G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright, trans. D. Paul and G.E.M. Anscombe, New York: Harper.

    (Suggests that beliefs or claims are justified on the basis of communally accepted propositions.)

Print
Citing this article:
Schmitt, Frederick F.. Bibliography. Social epistemology, 1998, doi:10.4324/9780415249126-P046-1. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Taylor and Francis, https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/social-epistemology/v-1/bibliography/social-epistemology-bib.
Copyright © 1998-2020 Routledge.

Related Searches

Topics

Related Articles