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Social laws

DOI
10.4324/9780415249126-R028-1
DOI: 10.4324/9780415249126-R028-1
Version: v1,  Published online: 1998
Retrieved April 23, 2019, from https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/social-laws/v-1

Article Summary

Social science has always aspired to be like natural science (Hawthorn 1976). And since natural science claims to discover laws of nature, social science has always claimed to discover laws of society. There are two important problems raised by such social laws. What makes the laws social in the appropriate sense? And if they really obtain, does that mean that human beings are not as autonomous as one might have thought: that we are pawns in a game that the laws control?

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Citing this article:
Pettit, Philip. Social laws, 1998, doi:10.4324/9780415249126-R028-1. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Taylor and Francis, https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/social-laws/v-1.
Copyright © 1998-2019 Routledge.

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