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Benson, D.F. and Zaidel, E. (1985) The Dual Brain: Hemispheric Specialization in Humans, New York: Guilford. (A representative sample of the psychological and neuroscientific work inspired, in part, by the split-brain phenomena; some of the articles require some advanced technical knowledge.) |
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Bogen, J.E. (1985) ‘The Dual Brain: Some Historical and Methodological Aspects’, in D.F.
Benson and E.
Zaidel (eds) The Dual Brain: Hemispheric Specialization in Humans, New York: Guilford, 27–43. (History of thought on the two cerebral hemispheres and partial defence of his ‘two persons’ account of uncommissurotomized human beings; good bibliography. Some technical knowledge necessary.) |
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Eccles, J.C. (1970) ‘The Brain and the Unity of Conscious Experience’, in Facing Reality: Philosophical Adventures of a Brain Scientist, New York: Springer, 63–84. (Argument that right hemisphere processes are not conscious.) |
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Gillett, G. (1986) ‘Brain Bisection and Personal Identity’, Mind
95: 224–229. (Doubts about whether the right hemisphere is a conscious rational thinker.) |
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McKay, D.M. (1966) ‘Cerebral Organization and the Conscious Control of Actions’, in J.C.
Eccles (ed.) Brain and Conscious Experience, Heidelberg: Springer, 422–444. (Argument that there is a single control structure for the operations of the disconnected hemispheres.) |
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Marks, C.E. (1981) Commissurotomy, Consciousness, and Unity of Mind, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Defence of a conservative interpretation of the split-brain phenomena; extensive bibliography.) |
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Nagel, T. (1971) ‘Brain Bisection and the Unity of Consciousness’, Synthèse
22: 396–413; repr. in Mortal Questions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979, 147–164. (Argument that the split-brain data present an obstacle to understanding the physical basis of mind.) |
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Puccetti, R. (1973) ‘Brain Bisection and Personal Identity’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
42: 339–355. (Argument that the split-brain data lead to the view that uncommissurotomized human beings have two streams of consciousness and are two persons.) |
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Puccetti, R. (1981) ‘The Case for Mental Duality: Evidence from Split-Brain Data and Other Considerations’, Behavioral and Brain Sciences
4: 93–123. (Amplification of the viewpoint of Puccetti (1973); with extensive commentary, the author’s responses and a large bibliography.) |
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Sperry, R.W. (1968) ‘Hemisphere Deconnection and Unity in Conscious Awareness’, American Psychologist
23: 723–733. (Early presentation of the view that split-brain patients, but not those with unsplit brains, have two spheres of consciousness and two minds. Good non-technical introduction to the empirical data by the leading researcher.) |
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Sperry, R.W. (1977a) ‘Consciousness, Personal Identity, and the Divided Brain’, repr. with editorial updating of references, in D.F.
Benson and E.
Zaidel (eds) The Dual Brain: Hemispheric Specialization in Humans, New York: Guildford, 1985, 11–26. (Amplification and defence of the viewpoint of the previous article; excellent bibliography. Good introduction to empirical research.) |
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Sperry, R.W. (1977b) ‘Forebrain Commissurotomy and Conscious Awareness’, repr. in C.
Travarthen (ed.) Brain Circuits and Functions of the Mind: Essays in Honor of Roger W. Sperry, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, 371–388. (Also an amplification and defence of the viewpoint of Sperry’s 1968 article, including his most careful consideration of rival views; excellent bibliography.) |
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Travarthen, C. (1990) Brain Circuits and Functions of the Mind: Essays in Honor of Roger W. Sperry, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (A representative sample of the psychological and neuroscientific work inspired, in part, by the split-brain phenomena; some of the articles require some advanced technical knowledge.) |
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Wilkes, K.V. (1988) Real People: Personal Identity without Thought Experiments, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 132–167. (Expanded version of her earlier conservative assessment of the split-brain phenomena.) |