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Balashov, Y. and Janssen, M. (2003) ‘Presentism and Relativity’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
54: 327–346. (A sustained critique of one attempt to reconcile presentism with the special theory of relativity.) |
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Bourne, C. (2002) ‘When am I? A Tense Time for Some Tensed Theorists?’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy
80: 359–371. (A presentation of the argument that nonpresentist A-theories cannot guarantee our knowledge that we are in the present.) |
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Bourne, C. (2006) A Future for Presentism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (A thorough, readable and scientifically informed book-length defence of presentism.) |
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Braddon-Mitchell, D. (2004) ‘How Do We Know It Is Now Now?’, Analysis
64 (3): 199–203. (A short and pithy presentation of the argument that on ‘growing block’ theories the current time is almost certainly not the present.) |
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Craig, W. L. (2000) The Tensed Theory of Time: A Critical Examination, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. (A presentation and defence of arguments in favour of the A-theory, and an examination and critique of arguments against it: thorough, but dense.) |
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Dainton, B. (2001) Time and Space, Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press. (Wonderfully accessible discussion of all of the main issues in the philosophy of time and an ideal starting point for anyone interested in the philosophy of time.) |
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Dyke, H. (2002) ‘McTaggart and the Truth about Time’, in C.
Callender (ed.) Time, Reality and Experience, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 137–152. (Defence of McTaggart’s paradox as a problem for the A-theory of time, and defence of the B-theory against some criticisms: fairly accessible.) |
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Dyke, H. (2002) ‘Tokens, Dates and Tenseless Truth Conditions’, Synthese
131: 329–351. (A detailed examination of the different accounts of tenseless truth conditions and their metaphysical significance.) |
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Dyke, H. (2003) ‘Temporal Language and Temporal Reality’, Philosophical Quarterly
53: 380–391. (Argues that it is a mistake to draw ontological conclusions about the nature of time from premises about the nature of temporal language, a trap that A-theorists fall into, but B-theorists don’t.) |
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Dyke, H. (2007) Metaphysics and the Representational Fallacy, London: Routledge. (A general investigation into the relationship between language and reality that initially focuses on this issue in the philosophy of time.) |
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Horwich, P. (1987) Asymmetries in Time: Problems in the Philosophy of Science, Cambridge MA: MIT Press. (An examination of issues in the philosophy of time as they connect up with issues in the philosophy of science.) |
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Le Poidevin, R. (1991) Change, Cause and Contradiction, Basingstoke: Macmillan. (A defence of the B-theory of time: moderately accessible.) |
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Le Poidevin, R. and MacBeath, M. (1993) The Philosophy of Time, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (A collection of previously published and important papers on time, with a very useful introduction.) |
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Ludlow, P. (1999) Semantics, Tense and Time: An Essay in the Metaphysics of Natural Language, Cambridge MA: MIT Press. (A book-length defence of the view that features of natural language imply presentism.) |
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McTaggart, J. M. E. (1927) The Nature of Existence, vol. 2, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Contains McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time.) |
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Markosian, N. (2004) ‘A Defense of Presentism’, in D. W.
Zimmerman (ed.) Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, vol. 1, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 47–82. (A defence of presentism against four of the most serious objections it faces.) |
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Mellor, D. H. (1981) Real Time, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (The first book-length articulation and defence of the B-theory of time: thorough, well-argued, but quite difficult in places.) |
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Mellor, D. H. (1998) Real Time II, London: Routledge. (A largely rewritten version of the previous item.) |
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Oaklander, L. N. (1984) Temporal Relations and Temporal Becoming: A Defense of a Russellian Theory of Time, Lanham, MD: University Press of America. (A defence of the B-theory of time: moderately accessible.) |
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Oaklander, L. N. and Smith, Q. (1994) The New Theory of Time, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. (A collection of previously published papers on time charting the development of the A-theory/B-theory debate with particular emphasis on the significance of tensed language. Contains useful introductions to each section.) |
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Perry, J. (1979) ‘The Problem of the Essential Indexical’, Noûs
13: 3–21. (A classic article on the irreducibility of indexical belief.) |
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Quine, W. V. O. (1964) ‘Time’, in J . J. C.
Smart (ed.) Problems of Space and Time, New York: Macmillan, 370–384. (A classic statement of the view that tensed language is reducible to tenseless language.) |
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Saunders, S. (2002) ‘How Relativity contradicts Presentism’, in C.
Callender (ed.) Time, Reality and Experience, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 277–292. (Argues that presentism and special relativity are irreconcilably inconsistent.) |
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Savitt, S. F. (2000) ‘A Limited Defence of Passage’, American Philosophical Quarterly
38 (3): 261–270. (A critique of McTaggart’s paradox by a B-theorist.) |
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Sider, T. (2001) Four- dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (A rigorous and elegantly written book-length defence of four- dimensionalism, both as a theory of time and as a theory of persistence. Contains an excellent critique of presentism.) |
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Smart, J. J. C. (1980) ‘Time and Becoming’, in P.
van Inwagen (ed.) Time and Cause, Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 3–15. (An early statement of the new B-theory of time.) |
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Smith, Q. (1993) Language and Time, New York: Oxford University Press. (A detailed defence of a version of the A-theory of time: quite difficult and technical.) |
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Tooley, M. (1997) Time, Tense and Causation, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Develops a ‘closed past, open future’ version of the A-theory, making use of the concept of causation.) |