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Truth, coherence theory of

DOI
10.4324/9780415249126-N063-1
DOI: 10.4324/9780415249126-N063-1
Version: v1,  Published online: 1998
Retrieved July 03, 2020, from https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/truth-coherence-theory-of/v-1

Article Summary

The term ‘coherence’ in the phrase ‘coherence theory of truth’ has never been very precisely defined. The most we can say by way of a general definition is that a set of two or more beliefs are said to cohere if they ‘fit’ together or ‘agree’ with one another. Typically, then, a coherence theory of truth would claim that the beliefs of a given individual are true to the extent that the set of all their beliefs is coherent. Such theories, thus, make truth a matter of a truth bearer’s relations to other truth bearers rather than its relations to reality. This latter implication is the chief hindrance to plausibility faced by coherence theories, and most coherence theorists try to escape the problem by denying that there is any extra-mental reality.

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Citing this article:
Kirkham, Richard L.. Truth, coherence theory of, 1998, doi:10.4324/9780415249126-N063-1. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Taylor and Francis, https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/truth-coherence-theory-of/v-1.
Copyright © 1998-2020 Routledge.

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