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Broome, J. (1984) ‘Indefiniteness in Identity’, Analysis
44: 6–12. (Discussion of whether objects can have vague identities.) |
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Dummett, M. (1975) ‘Wang’s Paradox’, Synthè se
25: 301–324. (Vague observational predicates as logically incoherent.) |
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Evans, G. (1978) ‘Can There Be Vague Objects?’, Analysis
38: 208. (An argument against the existence of vague objects.) |
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Fine, K. (1975) ‘Vagueness, Truth, and Logic’, Synthèse
25: 265–300. (Classic early presentation of vagueness as semantic indecision.) |
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Forbes, G. (1985) The Metaphysics of Modality, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Includes a version of the degrees-of-truth approach.) |
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Goguen, J. (1969) ‘The Logic of Inexact Concepts’, Synthè se
19: 325–373. (An early statement of the degrees-of-truth theory.) |
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Heller, M. (1990) The Ontology of Physical Objects: Four-Dimensional Hunks of Matter, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Sorites arguments deployed in defence of the view that the world is precise.) |
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Horgan, T. (1994a) Spindel Conference on Vagueness, supplement to Southern Journal of Philosophy
33. (Good collection of new papers on vagueness.) |
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Horgan, T. (1994b) ‘Robust Vagueness and the Forced March Sorites Paradox’, Philosophical Perspectives
8: 159–188. (A new form of sorites reasoning and its consequences.) |
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Inwagen, P. van (1988) ‘How To Reason About Vague Objects’, Philosophical Topics
16: 255–284. (A non-classical logic for reasoning about vague objects.) |
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Lewis, D.K. (1986) The Plurality of Worlds, Oxford: Blackwell. (Simple statement of the semantic indecision theory.) |
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Lewis, D.K. (1993) ‘Many, But Almost One’, in K.
Campbell, J.
Bacon and L.
Reinhardt (eds) Ontology, Causality, and Mind: Essays on the Philosophy of D.M. Armstrong, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Arguments against the existence of vague objects.) |
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Putnam, H. (1983) ‘Vagueness and Alternative Logic’, Erkenntnis
19: 297–314. (A discussion of vagueness and non-classical logic.) |
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Sainsbury, M. (1991) ‘Is There Higher-Order Vagueness?’, Philosophical Quarterly
41: 167–182. (Discussion of whether there can be borderline borderline cases.) |
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Sanford, D. (1975) ‘Borderline Logic’, American Philosophical Quarterly
12: 29–39. (Formal development of the degrees-of-truth approach.) |
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Sorensen, R. (1988) Blindspots, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Vagueness as ignorance.) |
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Thomason, R. (1982) ‘Identity and Vagueness’, Philosophical Studies
42: 329–332. (Discussion of Evans’ argument from identity against the existence of vague objects.) |
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Tye, M. (1990) ‘Vague Objects’, Mind
99: 535–557. (Vagueness in both the object language and the metalanguage; defence of vagueness in the world.) |
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Unger, P. (1979a) ‘There are No Ordinary Things’, Synthèse
41: 117–154. (Sorites arguments against the existence of ordinary things.) |
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Unger, P. (1979b) ‘Why There are No People’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy
4: 177–222. (Sorites arguments against the existence of people.) |
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Wheeler, S. (1979) ‘On That Which is Not’, Synthèse
41: 155–173. (Sorites arguments against the existence of ordinary things.) |
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Williamson, T. (1994) Vagueness, London: Routledge. (Clear defence of the view that vagueness is ignorance.) |
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Williamson, T. (1975) ‘On the Coherence of Vague Predicates’, Synthèse
30: 325–363. (Broad examination of the nature of vagueness.) |
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Zadeh, L. (1965) ‘Fuzzy Sets’, Information and Control
8: 338–353. (Early presentation of the degrees-of-truth approach.) |