Print

Davidson, Donald (1917–2003)

DOI
10.4324/9780415249126-U057-1
Versions
DOI: 10.4324/9780415249126-U057-1
Version: v1,  Published online: 1998
Retrieved March 28, 2024, from https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/biographical/davidson-donald-1917-2003/v-1

6. Indirect quotation

Indirect quotation attributions have long been known to possess features which frustrate the construction of satisfactory theories of meaning. For example, the inference (1)–(3) is an apparent instance of substitutivity of identity but it is invalid:

  • (1) Galileo said that the earth moves.

  • (2) The earth = the third planet from the sun.

  • (3) So, Galileo said that the third planet from the sun moves.

Davidson’s analysis of indirect discourse is driven by the desire to find a way of incorporating contexts like (1) into a truth theory for a language containing them (1984: 176). His proposal is that we analyse utterances of (1) as consisting of two distinct utterances:

  • (4) Galileo said that. [The earth moves.]

The first part of (4) is just a relational statement; the second part does not function semantically as part of what is said, but rather is there to serve as the referent of the demonstrative ‘that’ in an utterance of the first part. How does this get the truth-conditions right? According to Davidson, (4) is true just in case what the speaker has referred to as ‘that’ is an utterance which samesays some assertive utterance by Galileo. ‘Samesays’ is treated somewhat casually: it is whatever relation between the utterances is required for things to come out intuitively right; two utterances samesay each other just in case they agree in content, import or purport.

Since paraphrase (4) of (1) contains a demonstrative, it is true or false only relative to a context of utterance. A typical utterance of (1) creates a context relative to which ‘that’ refers to an utterance of the bracketed sentence in (4). And since in most contexts the occurrences of ‘that’ in (1) and (3) refer to different utterances, (1)–(3) is invalid. It is also clear that (1)–(3) is not an instance of substitutivity of identity, since, on Davidson’s analysis, the singular terms ‘the earth’ and ‘the third planet from the sun’ do not even occur in (1) and (3).

Despite important virtues, Davidson’s account has not won anything like general acceptance. The literature is replete with objections: for example, Lepore and Loewer(1989). Some authors complain the account is too strong; others that it is too weak, and others that it fails to generalize, for example, to other propositional attitudinal ascriptions or to de re constructions (see Propositional attitude statements §3).

Print
Citing this article:
Lepore, Ernie. Indirect quotation. Davidson, Donald (1917–2003), 1998, doi:10.4324/9780415249126-U057-1. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Taylor and Francis, https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/biographical/davidson-donald-1917-2003/v-1/sections/indirect-quotation.
Copyright © 1998-2024 Routledge.