Davidson, Donald (1917–2003)

1. Reasons and causes

Since 1963, with the publication of ‘Actions, Reasons, and Causes’, Donald Davidson’s philosophical work has taken centre stage in analytic philosophy. He begins this essay with the question: what is the relation between a reason and an action when that reason explains the action by giving the agent’s reasons for performing it? Prior to this essay, something like a consensus had formed in philosophy that this relationship was not causal. Discussion tended to centre around why it could not be causal and the consequences of its not being so.

Davidson’s central purpose was ‘to defend the ancient – and commonsense – position that rationalization is a species of causal explanation’ (Davidson 1980: 3). A large portion of the essay is devoted to refuting various arguments, quite popular then, that purported to show that reasons could not be causes of the actions they rationalize. The arguments are too many and varied to be properly treated here, but in passing I note that they were largely inspired by remarks made by Wittgenstein and/or certain interpretations of Humean strictures on causation. Each argument proposes that a necessary condition for two items to interact causally is not satisfied by reasons and actions. Davidson replies to the leading arguments by showing in each case either that reasons and actions indeed satisfy the necessary condition in question or that the allegedly necessary condition for causal interaction is not necessary at all (see Action).