|
Block, N. (1980) ‘Troubles with Functionalism’, in N.
Block (ed.) Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, vol. 1, 268–305. (Good presentation of the varieties of functionalism, and source for the ‘China-head’ example. The first part employs some technical notation.) |
|
Clark, A. (1993) Sensory Qualities, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Presents a theory of sensory qualities as points in a multidimensional quality space defined in terms of similarity judgments. Very detailed and somewhat technical.) |
|
Dennett, D.C. (1991) Consciousness Explained, Boston, MA: Little, Brown. (Makes the case for eliminativism about qualia.) |
|
Hardin, C.L. (1988) Color for Philosophers: Unweaving the Rainbow, Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company. (Excellent review of the empirical literature regarding colour. Argues both for irrealism about objective colour and against the inverted spectrum argument in support of a functional analysis.) |
|
Harrison, B. (1973) Form and Content, Oxford: Blackwell. (One of the earliest attempts to combat the inverted spectrum argument through a close consideration of the actual structure of colour experience.) |
|
Hilbert, D.R. (1987) Colour and Colour Perception: A Study in Anthropocentric Realism, Stanford, CA: Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford University. (Argues for a realist account of objective colour. Extensive use of empirical findings.) |
|
Jackson, F. (1982) ‘Epiphenomenal Qualia’, Philosophical Quarterly 32: 127–36. (Source for the example about Mary the vision scientist. Argues that sensory qualia are non-physical and do not causally interact with physical states.) |
|
Kripke, S. (1980) Naming and Necessity, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Classic presentation of the position that the reference of ‘natural kind’ terms, such as ‘water’ and ‘gold’, is determined by scientifically discovered essences.) |
|
Levine, J. (1983) ‘Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64: 354–61. (Raises the problem of the ‘explanatory gap’). |
|
Levine, J. (1993) ‘On Leaving Out What It’s Like’, in M.
Davies and G.
Humphreys (eds) Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays, Oxford: Blackwell, 121–36. (Argues for the claim, presented in §3, that the explanatory gap underlies standard objections to identity theory, as well as the claim that the reduction of water to H2O is different from the reduction of subjective red to a neural state.) |
|
Lycan, W.G. (1987) Consciousness, Cambridge, MA: Bradford Books/MIT Press. (Defends a thoroughgoing functionalist theory of conscious states.) |
|
Rey, G. (1992) ‘Sensational Sentences Switched’, Philosophical Studies 67: 77–103. (Combines a version of the representational theory of sensory qualities with eliminativist arguments, as described in §7, and applies it to the inverted spectrum problem.) |
|
Shoemaker, S. (1981) ‘The Inverted Spectrum’, Journal of Philosophy 74: 357–81. (Ingenious defence of functionalism in the face of the inverted spectrum argument, which Shoemaker, unlike other functionalists, endorses.) |
|
Smart, J.J.C. (1959) ‘Sensations and Brain Processes’, Philosophical Review 68: 141–56. (Classic presentation of the identity theory. The discussion of colour experience foreshadows functionalist theories.) |
|
Van Gulick, R. (1993) ‘Understanding the Phenomenal Mind: Are We All Just Armadillos?’, in M.
Davies and G.
Humphreys (eds) Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays, Oxford: Blackwell, 137–54. (Good survey of the various anti-functionalist arguments, with lines of reply to each.) |