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Epistemic relativism

DOI
10.4324/9780415249126-P016-1
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DOI: 10.4324/9780415249126-P016-1
Version: v1,  Published online: 1998
Retrieved January 20, 2018, from https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/epistemic-relativism/v-1

Article Summary

An account of what makes a system of reasoning or belief revision a good one is relativistic if it is sensitive to facts about the person or group using the system. It may then turn out that one system is best for one person or group, while a quite different system is best for another. Some of the most popular accounts of how systems of reasoning are to be assessed, including those based on reflective equilibrium and those based on the system’s truth-generating capacity, appear to be relativistic. It is sometimes claimed that epistemic relativism leads to nihilism or that it severs the connection between good reasoning and true belief.

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    Citing this article:
    Stich, Stephen P.. Epistemic relativism, 1998, doi:10.4324/9780415249126-P016-1. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Taylor and Francis, https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/epistemic-relativism/v-1.
    Copyright © 1998-2018 Routledge.

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