Epistemic relativism

References and further reading

	Daniels, N. (1980) ‘Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Archimedean Points’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 10: 83–103. (Discussion of the virtues and shortcomings of reflective-equilibrium accounts of justification.)
	Foley, R. (1987) The Theory of Epistemic Rationality, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (A sophisticated statement of an epistemic position that has some features of relativism.)
	Goldman, A. (1986) Epistemology and Cognition, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Important statement of reliabilism.)
	Goodman, N. (1965) Fact, Fiction and Forecast, Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill. (Referred to in §2 above. The classic statement of a reflective-equilibrium account of justification.)
	Hollis, M. and Lukes, S. (1982) Rationality and Relativism, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Collection of essays by philosophers, anthropologists and historians of science debating the evidence for descriptive pluralism and the merits of relativism.)
	Rawls, J. (1971) A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Classic work in which reflective equilibrium is used to defend an account of justics.)
	Stein, E. (1996) Without Good Reason: The Rationality Debate in Philosophy and Cognitive Science, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Systematic study of the empirical and philosophical literature relevant to relativism.)
	Stich, S. (1990) The Fragmentation of Reason, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Expansion of the material of this entry; see especially chapters 1, 4 and 6.)