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DOI
10.4324/9780415249126-L022-1
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DOI: 10.4324/9780415249126-L022-1
Version: v1,  Published online: 1998
Retrieved April 27, 2024, from https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/evil/v-1

3. Evil as illusory

The Stoic-Spinozistic view attempts to avoid these objections by denying the reality of evil. It acknowledges that evil appears to exist, but its appearance is said to be an illusion to which human beings succumb through misdirected desires (see Spinoza 1677). Such desires cannot be satisfied because they are contrary to the moral order of reality, which need not be supposed to be suprasensible. If the misdirection of these desires is recognized, then the unavoidable experience of frustration they cause will be seen as emotional detritus that has been misidentified as evil. The advantage of the Stoic-Spinozistic view is that if evil were indeed illusory rather than real, then the objection to the Socratic view that it is incapable of explaining the reality of evil would be met (see Spinoza, B. de §10; Stoicism §19).

The Stoic-Spinozistic view is undoubtedly right in that what appears to be evil may not be and that greater self-knowledge and self-control make it possible to avoid much unnecessary suffering caused by mistaking for evil the frustration of misdirected desires. This view, however, is advanced not merely as a proposal for alleviating some instances of evil, but as an explanation of all evil. And as such, it is a failure for several reasons.

First, it cannot reasonably be held that all desires are misdirected, for human nature requires having and satisfying some desires. Rightly directed desires, however, are often frustrated, their frustration often results in serious unjustified harm, and that is real evil which cannot be alleviated by growth in self-knowledge and self-control. Second, the distinction between real and illusory evil rests on moral beliefs, which may be true or false. This view is committed to holding that beliefs about the occurrence of evil are always false. For if some were true, not all evil could be illusory. If, on the other hand, beliefs about the occurrence of evil were always false, then the belief that torturing innocent people is evil, for instance, would also be false. It is, however, a precondition of morality, and indeed of civilized life, that such basic moral beliefs are regarded as true. The view that all evil is illusory, therefore, is incompatible with human nature, morality, and civilized life.

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Citing this article:
Kekes, John. Evil as illusory. Evil, 1998, doi:10.4324/9780415249126-L022-1. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Taylor and Francis, https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/evil/v-1/sections/evil-as-illusory.
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