Good, theories of the

4. The right and the good

Good is a ubiquitous term, applying to almost any sort of thing, but actions, policies and laws are also praised as being ‘right’ or ‘just’. Right actions are those which are required by morality or, more extensively, those not forbidden by morality, not ‘wrong’. So a question arises about the relation between these two kinds of value, the right and the good. Consequentialists think that the relation is simple: right actions are those which tend to maximize good results, so that rightness is actually a form of instrumental goodness (see Consequentialism). Yet we sometimes seem to care about doing the right thing independently of, or even in the teeth of, the consequences that it produces. We may decide that we will uphold someone’s rights, or obey the law, or keep a promise, though we know the results will be bad, because, as we say, ‘it is the principle of the thing’. Consequentialists think this attitude is either an acknowledgement of the especially important consequences that result from the observance of certain rules, or else a misguided form of rule-worship. But ‘deontologists’ believe there is something valuable about doing the right thing apart from the good results it may or may not produce (see Deontological ethics).

Since deontologists deny that rightness is merely an instrumental value, we might be tempted to say they think of rightness as either a final good or a special kind of intrinsic value, characteristic of actions. But this does not completely capture the deontological intuition. Final and intrinsic values, as they are often conceived, may be weighed in with other values, so on this view we might sometimes endure wrongdoing, as we sometimes endure pain, for the sake of the larger benefits it brings. But deontologists deny that such values as freedom, justice, or fidelity may be traded off for other goods. They also believe that the way in which right actions serve these values is not by producing or causing them, but instead is direct or constitutive. For example, a deontologist may think that it is right to keep a promise, not because fidelity to promises is thereby efficiently produced (for we can imagine circumstances in which one person’s keeping a promise will induce others to break theirs), but because it is an act of fidelity. And we respect human rights, not because this produces freedom, but because this is what freedom consists in – living in a world in which human rights are respected.

The question of the relation between the right and the good therefore gives rise to deep questions about the relations between actions and the values they serve. But these questions belong more properly to a discussion of the right (see Right and good).