Hope

2. The concept of hope

Hope can be either intentional or dispositional (see Intentionality). Intentional hope is oriented to some desired state of affairs which is believed to be attainable. Hobbes describes such hope as an ‘appetite with an opinion of attaining’ (1651: 123; original emphasis). Dispositional hope is a state of being hopeful. This state should be distinguished from optimism and wishful thinking.

A philosophical formulation of optimism is given in Leibniz’s work (1710). For Leibniz, the thought that God could have created anything less than the best of all possible worlds is self-contradictory, since it would mean that God would not be the most perfect being, and hence would not be God (see Leibniz, G.W. §§3, 7). Consequently, we can be certain that present suffering is for the greater good and that the future will be as good as it can be (see Evil, problem of §2). This confidence that everything is for the best was famously, and justifiably, ridiculed in Voltaire’s Candide (1759). But, unlike optimism, being hopeful is not based on the certainty that things will get better. Hope, unlike optimism, presupposes a degree of uncertainty. Descartes noted this when he pointed out that ‘[w]hen hope is extreme, it changes its nature and is called “confidence” or “assurance”’ (1649: 351) (see also Spinoza 1677: 106–7).

Hope should also be distinguished from wishful thinking. It is as impossible to hope legitimately for something which is impossible as it is inappropriate to hope for something which is certain. All wishful thinking is by its nature illusory, whereas only illegitimate hopes are illusory.