Knowledge, concept of

DOI: 10.4324/9780415249126-P031-1
Version: v1,  Published online: 1998
Retrieved June 21, 2021, from

References and further reading

  • Alston, W. (1989) Epistemic Justification, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

    (Develops and defends a theory of knowledge containing elements of internalism and externalism.)

  • Annis, D. (1978) ‘A contextualist theory of epistemic justification‘, American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (3): 213–219.

    (A non-technical contextualist account of justification.)

  • Aristotle (3rd century) Posterior Analytics, ed. and trans. J. Barnes, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975.

    (Aristotle proposes and defends an empirical foundationalist account of knowledge. It can be viewed as containing a basis for a reliabilist account of knowledge of first principles in science.)

  • Armstrong, D. (1973) Belief, Truth and Knowledge, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    (One of the first carefully developed reliabilist accounts of knowledge.)

  • Audi, R. (1993) The Structure of Justification, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    (Develops and defends a version of foundationalism.)

  • Ayer, A.J. (1940) Foundations of Empirical Knowledge, London: Macmillan.

    (Develops and defends a foundationalist account of the structure of reasons.)

  • BonJour, L. (1985) The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    (Contains a sophisticated defence of coherentism.)

  • Broad, C.D. (1965) ‘The Theory of Sensa’ in R. Swartz (ed.) Perceiving, Sensing and Knowing, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

    (Develops the sense-data theory of knowledge. The collection contains many of the most important papers on perception written in the early- and mid-twentieth century.)

  • Chisholm, R. (1966) Theory of Knowledge, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall; 2nd edn, 1977; 3rd edn, 1989.

    (The successive editions contain increasingly complex foundationalist accounts of knowledge along with versions of the defeasibility account.)

  • Code, L. (1991) What Can She Know? Feminist Theory and the Construction of Knowledge, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

    (Contains a sophisticated feminist challenge to traditional epistemology.)

  • Craig, E. (1990) Knowledge and the State of Nature, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    (The concept of knowledge approached by asking ‘why do we have it?’ Assumes some familiarity with the current debate. Mentioned in §10 above.)

  • Davidson, D. (1983) ‘A coherence theory of truth and knowledge‘, in E. LePore (ed.) Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford: Blackwell, 1986.

    (Contains an account of the coherence theory of knowledge, as well as arguments for the claim that coherent beliefs must be true in the main.)

  • DeRose, K. (1995) ‘Solving the Skeptical Problem‘, Philosophical Review 104 (January): 1–52.

    (Develops a contextualist theory of knowledge and uses it to address the problem of scepticism.)

  • Descartes, R. (1641) Meditations on First Philosophy, in E. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross (eds) The Philosophical Works of Descartes, vol. 1, Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 1955.

    (Contains a classic formulation of rationalistic foundationalism. Meditation I contains the ‘Cartesian’ argument for scepticism which he rejects in the following five meditations; Mediation IV employs the notion of warrant requiring non-accidentally true beliefs – see especially paragraphs 11–13 on page 176 of this edition.)

  • Dewey, J. (1929) The Quest for Certainty: Gifford Lectures 1929, New York: Capricorn, 1960.

    (Contains a contextualist account of doubt and justification.)

  • Dretske F. (1981) Knowledge and the Flow of Information, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    (Contains a reliabilist account of knowledge employing information theory.)

  • Foley, R. (1987) A Theory of Epistemic Rationality, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    (Develops and defends a sophisticated version of subjective justification.)

  • Gettier, E. (1963) ‘Is justified true belief knowledge?‘, Analysis 23 (6): 121–123.

    (This article was responsible for focusing attention on the inadequacies of characterizing warrant in terms of justification alone.)

  • Goldman, A. (1967) ‘A causal theory of knowing‘, Journal of Philosophy 64 (12) 357–372.

    (The first careful statement of the causal theory of warrant.)

  • Goldman, A. (1986) Epistemology and Cognition, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    (Contains a sophisticated development and defence of reliabilism.)

  • Goodman, N. (1965) Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 2nd edn.

    (Contains the formulation of the Grue Paradox discussed in §9 above.)

  • Klein, P. (1981) Certainty: A Refutation of Scepticism, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

    (Examines various forms of scepticism and develops the defeasibility theory of knowledge as a response to scepticism.)

  • Klein, P. (1996) ‘Skepticism and closure: why the evil genius argument fails‘, Philosophical Topics 23 (1) spring 1995: 215–238.

    (Develops the ‘question-begging’ reply to scepticism briefly discussed in §8 above.)

  • Lehrer, K. (1990) Theory of Knowledge, Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

    (An accessible introduction to the fundamental questions in epistemology that defends a version of coherentism and contains arguments against externalism including the TrueTemp example cited in §6 above; see especially pages 163–75.)

  • Locke, J. (1689) An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. A.C. Fraser, Mineola, New York: Dover Publications, 1959.

    (Contains the classic defence of empirical foundationalism conforming to the constraint that knowledge cannot be accidentally true belief. See especially Book XI, chapter 23, section 28 – pages 413–14 of this edition.)

  • Lucey, K. (1996) On Knowing and the Known, Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books.

    (A comprehensive and accessible collection of essays on the concept of knowledge.)

  • Moore, G.E. (1953) Some Main Problems of Philosophy, New York: Collier Books, 1962.

    (The text of lectures given in 1910–11. See especially chapter 2 which develops the sense-data foundationalist theory of knowledge.)

  • Moser, P. (1989) Knowledge and Evidence, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    (Contains a sophisticated development of foundationalism.)

  • Nozick, R. (1981) Philosophical Explanations, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    (Develops and defends a reliabilist account of knowledge.)

  • Plantinga, A. (1993) Warrant: The Current Debate, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    (A good source for discussions of various accounts of warrant.)

  • Plato (4th century) Theaetetus, in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, ed. E. Hamilton and H. Cairns, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961.

    (Suggests that knowledge cannot be mere true belief even with a justification; but Plato does not suggest what the missing feature is.)

  • Pollock, J. (1986) Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield.

    (Examines various contemporary accounts of knowledge and justification and develops a sophisticated version of the defeasibility theory.)

  • Prichard, H.A. (1950) Knowledge and Perception, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

    (Defends the view that knowledge is not a species of belief. See page 88 and following.)

  • Quine, W.V.O and Ullian, J. (1978) The Web of Belief, 2nd edn, New York: Random House.

    (A very accessible defence of coherentism.)

  • Radford, C. (1966) ‘Knowledge – by examples’ Analysis 27 (1): 1–11.

    (Defends the view that belief is not a necessary condition of knowledge.)

  • Sextus Empiricus (c. 200) Outlines of Pyrrhonism, trans. R.G. Bury, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press and London: Heinemann, 1976.

    (See especially book I, chapter 15, for the argument that the three logically possible theories of justification lead to scepticism.)

  • Shope, R. (1983) The Analysis of Knowing, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

    (A thorough discussion of the Gettier Problem and the various approaches to solving it.)

  • Sosa, E. (1991) Knowledge in Perspective, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    (Contains an interesting version of reliabilism that is designed to address issues generated by traditional normative epistemology.)

  • Sosa, E. (1994) Knowledge and Justification, vols 1 and 2, Brookfield, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company.

    (Contains a comprehensive set of essays on knowledge and justification.)

  • Zagzebski, L. (1996) Virtues of the Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    (Develops an account of virtue epistemology based on virtue ethics.)

Citing this article:
Klein, Peter D.. Bibliography. Knowledge, concept of, 1998, doi:10.4324/9780415249126-P031-1. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Taylor and Francis,
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