Alston, W. (1989) Epistemic Justification, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
(Develops and defends a theory of knowledge containing elements of internalism and externalism.)
Annis, D. (1978) ‘A contextualist theory of epistemic justification‘, American Philosophical Quarterly
15 (3): 213–219.
(A non-technical contextualist account of justification.)
Aristotle (3rd century) Posterior Analytics, ed. and trans.
Barnes, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975.
(Aristotle proposes and defends an empirical foundationalist account of knowledge. It can be viewed as containing a basis for a reliabilist account of knowledge of first principles in science.)
Armstrong, D. (1973) Belief, Truth and Knowledge, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
(One of the first carefully developed reliabilist accounts of knowledge.)
Audi, R. (1993) The Structure of Justification, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
(Develops and defends a version of foundationalism.)
Ayer, A.J. (1940) Foundations of Empirical Knowledge, London: Macmillan.
(Develops and defends a foundationalist account of the structure of reasons.)
BonJour, L. (1985) The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
(Contains a sophisticated defence of coherentism.)
Broad, C.D. (1965) ‘The Theory of Sensa’ in R.
Swartz (ed.) Perceiving, Sensing and Knowing, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
(Develops the sense-data theory of knowledge. The collection contains many of the most important papers on perception written in the early- and mid-twentieth century.)
Chisholm, R. (1966) Theory of Knowledge, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall; 2nd edn, 1977; 3rd edn, 1989.
(The successive editions contain increasingly complex foundationalist accounts of knowledge along with versions of the defeasibility account.)
Code, L. (1991) What Can She Know? Feminist Theory and the Construction of Knowledge, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
(Contains a sophisticated feminist challenge to traditional epistemology.)
Craig, E. (1990) Knowledge and the State of Nature, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
(The concept of knowledge approached by asking ‘why do we have it?’ Assumes some familiarity with the current debate. Mentioned in §10 above.)
Davidson, D. (1983) ‘A coherence theory of truth and knowledge‘, in E.
LePore (ed.) Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford: Blackwell, 1986.
(Contains an account of the coherence theory of knowledge, as well as arguments for the claim that coherent beliefs must be true in the main.)
DeRose, K. (1995) ‘Solving the Skeptical Problem‘, Philosophical Review
104 (January): 1–52.
(Develops a contextualist theory of knowledge and uses it to address the problem of scepticism.)
Descartes, R. (1641) Meditations on First Philosophy, in E.
Haldane and G.R.T.
Ross (eds) The Philosophical Works of Descartes, vol. 1, Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 1955.
(Contains a classic formulation of rationalistic foundationalism. Meditation I contains the ‘Cartesian’ argument for scepticism which he rejects in the following five meditations; Mediation IV employs the notion of warrant requiring non-accidentally true beliefs – see especially paragraphs 11–13 on page 176 of this edition.)
Dewey, J. (1929) The Quest for Certainty: Gifford Lectures 1929, New York: Capricorn, 1960.
(Contains a contextualist account of doubt and justification.)
F. (1981) Knowledge and the Flow of Information, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
(Contains a reliabilist account of knowledge employing information theory.)
Foley, R. (1987) A Theory of Epistemic Rationality, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
(Develops and defends a sophisticated version of subjective justification.)
Gettier, E. (1963) ‘Is justified true belief knowledge?‘, Analysis
23 (6): 121–123.
(This article was responsible for focusing attention on the inadequacies of characterizing warrant in terms of justification alone.)
Goldman, A. (1967) ‘A causal theory of knowing‘, Journal of Philosophy
64 (12) 357–372.
(The first careful statement of the causal theory of warrant.)
Goldman, A. (1986) Epistemology and Cognition, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
(Contains a sophisticated development and defence of reliabilism.)
Goodman, N. (1965) Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 2nd edn.
(Contains the formulation of the Grue Paradox discussed in §9 above.)
Klein, P. (1981) Certainty: A Refutation of Scepticism, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
(Examines various forms of scepticism and develops the defeasibility theory of knowledge as a response to scepticism.)
Klein, P. (1996) ‘Skepticism and closure: why the evil genius argument fails‘, Philosophical Topics
23 (1) spring
(Develops the ‘question-begging’ reply to scepticism briefly discussed in §8 above.)
Lehrer, K. (1990) Theory of Knowledge, Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
(An accessible introduction to the fundamental questions in epistemology that defends a version of coherentism and contains arguments against externalism including the TrueTemp example cited in §6 above; see especially pages 163–75.)
Locke, J. (1689) An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed.
Fraser, Mineola, New York: Dover Publications, 1959.
(Contains the classic defence of empirical foundationalism conforming to the constraint that knowledge cannot be accidentally true belief. See especially Book XI, chapter 23, section 28 – pages 413–14 of this edition.)
Lucey, K. (1996) On Knowing and the Known, Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books.
(A comprehensive and accessible collection of essays on the concept of knowledge.)
Moore, G.E. (1953) Some Main Problems of Philosophy, New York: Collier Books, 1962.
(The text of lectures given in 1910–11. See especially chapter 2 which develops the sense-data foundationalist theory of knowledge.)
Moser, P. (1989) Knowledge and Evidence, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
(Contains a sophisticated development of foundationalism.)
Nozick, R. (1981) Philosophical Explanations, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
(Develops and defends a reliabilist account of knowledge.)
Plantinga, A. (1993) Warrant: The Current Debate, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
(A good source for discussions of various accounts of warrant.)
Plato (4th century) Theaetetus, in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, ed.
Hamilton and H.
Cairns, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961.
(Suggests that knowledge cannot be mere true belief even with a justification; but Plato does not suggest what the missing feature is.)
Pollock, J. (1986) Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield.
(Examines various contemporary accounts of knowledge and justification and develops a sophisticated version of the defeasibility theory.)
Prichard, H.A. (1950) Knowledge and Perception, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
(Defends the view that knowledge is not a species of belief. See page 88 and following.)
Quine, W.V.O and Ullian, J. (1978) The Web of Belief, 2nd edn, New York: Random House.
(A very accessible defence of coherentism.)
Radford, C. (1966) ‘Knowledge – by examples’ Analysis
27 (1): 1–11.
(Defends the view that belief is not a necessary condition of knowledge.)
Sextus Empiricus (c.
200) Outlines of Pyrrhonism, trans.
Bury, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press and London: Heinemann, 1976.
(See especially book I, chapter 15, for the argument that the three logically possible theories of justification lead to scepticism.)
Shope, R. (1983) The Analysis of Knowing, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
(A thorough discussion of the Gettier Problem and the various approaches to solving it.)
Sosa, E. (1991) Knowledge in Perspective, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
(Contains an interesting version of reliabilism that is designed to address issues generated by traditional normative epistemology.)
Sosa, E. (1994) Knowledge and Justification, vols 1 and 2, Brookfield, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company.
(Contains a comprehensive set of essays on knowledge and justification.)
Zagzebski, L. (1996) Virtues of the Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
(Develops an account of virtue epistemology based on virtue ethics.)