Version: v1, Published online: 2001
Retrieved April 21, 2021, from https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/legal-positivism-inclusive-versus-exclusive/v-1
References and further reading
Aquinas, Thomas (1266–73) Summa Theologica, various editions.
Austin, J. (1832) The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1954.
Coleman, J. (1982) ‘Negative and Positive Positivism’, Journal of Legal Studies 11: 139.
Coleman, J. (1996) ‘Authority and Reason’, in R. George (ed.), The Autonomy of Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Coleman, J. (1998) ‘Incorporationism, Conventionality and the Practical Difference Thesis’, Legal Theory 4: 381.
Coleman, J. (2001) The Practice of Principle, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dworkin, R.M. (1978) Taking Rights Seriously, London: Duckworth.
Dworkin, R.M. (1986) Law’s Empire, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Green, L. (1988) The Authority of the State, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Green, L. (1996) ‘The Concept of Law Revisited’, Michigan Law Review 94: 1687.
(A critical discussion of Hart’s Postscript to the second edition of The Concept of Law, advancing the thesis that Hart’s theoretical commitments should have led him away from inclusive and towards exclusive positivism.)
Hart, H.L.A. (1958) ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals’, Harvard Law Review 71: 593.
Hart, H.L.A. (1961) The Concept of Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994.
Hart, H.L.A. (1982) Essays on Bentham: Jurisprudence and Political Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hart, H.L.A. (1983) Essays on Jurisprudence and Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Himma, K. (2000) ‘H.L.A. Hart and the Practical Difference Thesis’, Legal Theory 6: 1.
Kramer, M. (1999) In Defense of Legal Positivism: Law Without Trimmings, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kramer, M. (2000) ‘How Moral Principles Can Enter Into the Law’, Legal Theory 6: 83.
Leiter, B. (1998) ‘Realism, Hard Positivism and Conceptual Analysis’, Legal Theory 4: 533.
Lyons, D. (1977) ‘Principles, Positivism and Legal Theory’, Yale Law Journal 87: 415.
Mackie, J. (1977) ‘The Third Theory of Law’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 7: 3.
Marmor, A. (1992) Interpretation and Legal Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Raz, J. (1972) ‘Legal Principles and the Limits of Law’, Yale Law Journal 81: 823.
Raz, J. (1979) The Authority of Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Raz, J. (1980) The Concept of a Legal System, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd edn.
Raz, J. (1985a) ‘Authority and Justification’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 14: 3.
Raz, J. (1985b) ‘Authority, Law and Morality’, The Monist 68: 295.
Shapiro, S. (1998a) ‘On Hart’s Way Out’, Legal Theory 4: 469.
Shapiro, S. (1998b) ‘The Difference that Rules Make’, in Brian Bix (ed.), Analyzing Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Shiner, R. (1992) Norm and Nature: The Movements of Legal Thought, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Soper, E.P. (1977) ‘Legal Theory and the Obligation of a Judge: The Hart/Dworkin Dispute’, Michigan Law Review 75: 473.
Waluchow, W.J. (1985) ‘Herculean Positivism’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 5: 41.
Waluchow, W.J. (1989) ‘The Weak Social Thesis’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 9: 23.
Waluchow, W.J. (1990) ‘Charter Challenges: A Test Case for Theories of Law’, Osgoode Hall Law Journal 29: 183.
Waluchow, W.J. (1994) Inclusive Legal Positivism, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Waluchow, W.J. (2000) ‘Authority and the Practical Difference Thesis: A Defense of Inclusive Legal Positivism’, Legal Theory 6: 45.
(A reply to various critics of Inclusive Legal Positivism and to Scott Shapiro’s argument that inclusive positivism violates legal positivism’s commitment to the practical difference thesis.)
Waluchow, Wilfrid. Bibliography. Legal positivism, inclusive versus exclusive, 2001, doi:10.4324/9780415249126-T064-1. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Taylor and Francis, https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/legal-positivism-inclusive-versus-exclusive/v-1/bibliography/legal-positivism-inclusive-versus-exclusive-bib.
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