Version: v1, Published online: 1998
Retrieved May 25, 2019, from https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/modularity-of-mind/v-1
A common view in recent philosophy of science is that there is no principled distinction between theoretical and observational claims, since perception itself is thoroughly contaminated by the beliefs and expectations of the observer. However, recent psychological and neurological evidence casts doubt on this latter claim and suggests, instead, that perceptual processing is to a significant extent ‘cognitively impenetrable’: it takes place in informationally encapsulated ‘modules’ that cannot be rationally influenced by beliefs or other ‘central’ cognitive states, or even other portions of the perceptual system.
Pylyshyn, Zenon W.. Modularity of mind, 1998, doi:10.4324/9780415249126-W025-1. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Taylor and Francis, https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/modularity-of-mind/v-1.
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