Moral psychology, empirical work in

References and further reading

	Baron, R. (1997) ‘The Sweet Smell of … Helping: Effects of Pleasant Ambient Fragrance on Prosocial Behavior in Shopping Malls’, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 23: 498–503. (Provides evidence that pleasant smells can increase helping behaviour.)
	Batson, C. D. (2011) Altruism in Humans. New York: Oxford University Press. (Updated defence of the existence of altruism in humans; includes more than social-psychological data.)
	Berker, S. (2009) ‘The Normative Insignificance of Neuroscience’, Philosophy & Public Affairs 37 (4): 293–329. (Argues the only way to keep the neuroscientific case against deontological intuitions from being fallacious is to recast it as independent of brain imaging data altogether.)
	Bourget, D. and Chalmers, D. (2009) ‘PhilPapers Survey: Results’, http://philpapers.org/surveys/results.pl (A systematic survey of around 900 professional philosophers concerning their beliefs on various core philosophical issues.)
	Cushman, F. Young, L. and Greene, J. (2010) ‘Multi-system Moral Psychology’, in J. M. Doris and the Moral Psychology Research Group (eds) The Moral Psychology Handbook, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 47–71. (Develops a dual-process model of various data on moral judgments about physical harms, comparing cognitive and conscious processes with affective and intuitive processes.)
	Damasio, A. (1994) Descartes’ Error. New York: Penguin Books. Originally published by Putnam, 10th-anniversary edn, 2005. (Argues emotions are required for normal action and judgment, primarily based on studying patients with brain damage.)
	Darwall, S. (1983) Impartial Reason, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University. (Argues clearly for an anti-Humean view of both motivation and reasons, along rationalist lines.)
	Doris, J. M. (2009) ‘Skepticism about Persons’, Philosophical Issues 19 (1): 57–91. ( Argues that empirical research precludes the kind reflective self-direction that many philosophers think is crucial to personhood or agency.)
	Doris, J. M. and the Moral Psychology Research Group (2010) The Moral Psychology Handbook, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Currently the most up to date and comprehensive source for discussion of empirically informed moral psychology; includes many topics not discussed here.)
	Greene, J. (2008) ‘The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul’, in W. Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology, vol. 3: Neuroscience of Morality, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 35–80. (Marshals a range of empirical evidence for the claim that deontological moral judgments are generated by processes that are less cognitive and more emotional than consequentialist intuitions.)
	Haidt, J. (2001) ‘The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment’, Psychological Review 108: 814–834. ( Reviews empirical evidence that moral judgments are typically formed by quick and automatic reactions while reasoning plays a more secondary role after the fact as a post hoc construction.)
	Hauser, M. D., Cushman, F. A., Young, L., Jin, R. and Mikhail, J. M. (2007) ‘A Dissociation Between Moral Judgments and Justifications’, Mind & Language 22 (1): 1–21. (Reports data on intuitions about various trolley cases supporting the hypothesis that deontological principles underwrite some moral judgments.)
	Holton, R. (2009) Willing, Wanting, Waiting, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Provides a generally anti-Humean account of various aspects of the will; appeals to both philosophical and empirical evidence.)
	Kane, R. (1999) ‘Responsibility, Luck, and Chance: Reflections on Free Will and Indeterminism’, Journal of Philosophy 96: 217–240. (Argues that free will and responsibility are incompatible with determinism.)
	Knobe, J. and Doris, J. M. (2010) ‘Responsibility’, in J. M. Doris and The Moral Psychology Research Group (eds) The Moral Psychology Handbook, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 321–354. ( Appealing to empirical research on ordinary intuitions, argues against the ‘invariantist assumption’ that judgments about moral responsibility should all be determined by the same criteria.)
	Knobe, J. and Nichols, S. (2008) Experimental Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Collection of articles that primarily probe ordinary intuitions about various philosophical topics and theoretical papers addressing this methodology.)
	Korsgaard, C. (1986) ‘Skepticism about Practical Reason’, Journal of Philosophy 83 (1): 5–25. (Argues that neo-Humean accounts of moral motivation cannot be supported without assuming a neo-Humean theory of the norms of practical reasoning.)
	Levy, N. (2011) ‘Resisting “Weakness of the Will”’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (1): 134–155. (Argues that weakness of will is not a psychological kind, by appealing to empirical research on self-control.)
	Mallon, R. and Nichols, S. (2010) ‘Rules’, in J. M. Doris and the Moral Psychology Research Group (eds) The Moral Psychology Handbook, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 297–320. (Defends the claim that moral judgment is in part guided by the representation of moral rules.)
	May, J. (2011) ‘Egoism, Empathy, and Self–Other Merging’, in Remy Debes (ed.) Spindel Supplement: Empathy and Ethics, special issue of Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (suppl.): 25–39. (Critiques arguments for psychological egoism that appeal to the idea that we blur the distinction between ourselves and others.)
	May, J. and Holton, R. (2012) ‘What in the World Is Weakness of Will?’, Philosophical Studies 157 (3): 341–360. (A defence of the ordinary notion of weakness of will as involving multiple factors, including intention violations, judgment violations and moral valence.)
	Mele, A. (2003) Motivation and Agency, New York: Oxford University Press. (Wide-ranging discussion of motivation and related topics; provides a rich conceptual framework.)
	Miller, C. (2009) ‘Social Psychology, Mood, and Helping: Mixed Results for Virtue Ethics’, Virtue Ethics and Moral Psychology: The Situationist Debate, special issue of Journal of Ethics 13: 145–173. (Reviews psychological effects of mood on helping; argues the research does not impugn the existence of some character traits.)
	Morillo, C. (1990) ‘The Reward Event and Motivation’, Journal of Philosophy 87 (4): 169–186. (A recent defence of a kind of psychological hedonism based on work in neuroscience.)
	Muraven, M., Tice, D. M. and Baumeister, R. F. (1998) ‘Self-Control as a Limited Resource: Regulatory Depletion Patterns’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 74 (3): 774–789 (Provides evidence that self-control relies on a store of energy that can be depleted.)
	Nadelhoffer, T., Nahmias, E. and Nichols, S. (2010) Moral Psychology: Historical and Contemporary Readings, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. (A recent collection juxtaposing important empirical and nonempirical readings; includes useful introductions to sections.)
	Nahmias, E., Morris, S., Nadelhoffer, T. and Turner, J. (2006) ‘Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73: 28–53; repr. in J. Knobe and S. Nichols (eds) Experimental Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 81–104. (Argues that ordinary intuitions reflect the conviction that determinism is actually compatible with free will and moral responsibility.)
	Nahmias, E. (2007) ‘Autonomous Agency and Social Psychology’, in M. Maraffa, M. De Caro and F. Ferretti (eds) Cartographies of the Mind, Dordrecht: Springer, 169–185. (Argues that free will may be undermined to a certain degree based on situationist research in social psychology.)
	Nahmias, E. (2004) Sentimental Rules: On the Natural Foundations of Moral Judgment. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Argues in an interdisciplinary way that moral judgments are formed by applying norms, which are based primarily on sentiments or emotional responses.)
	Nichols, S. and Knobe, J. (2007) ‘Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuitions’, Noûs 41 (4): 663–685; repr. in J. Knobe and S. Nichols (eds) Experimental Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 105–126. (Provides evidence that ordinary people tend to report compatibilist intuitions about moral responsibility and determinism only when the cases judged elicit more emotional reactions.)
	Roskies, A (2003) ‘Are Ethical Judgments Intrinsically Motivational? Lessons From “Acquired Sociopathy”’. Philosophical Psychology 16 (1): 51–66. (Argues that patients with damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex are counterexamples to a strong form of motivational internalism.)
	Schnall, S., Haidt, J. Clore, G. L. and Jordan, A. H. (2008) ‘Disgust as Embodied Moral Judgment’, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 34: 1096–1109. (Provides some evidence that disgust makes some people provide harsher moral judgments about some hypothetical scenarios.)
	Schroeder, T. (2004) Three Faces of Desire. New York: Oxford University Press. (Philosopher’s defence of a reward-based theory of desire, grounded in empirical work largely from neuroscience.)
	Schroeder, T., Roskies, A. and Nichols, S. (2010) ‘Moral Motivation’, in J. M. Doris and the Moral Psychology Research Group (eds) The Moral Psychology Handbook, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 72–110 . (An examination of the neurological basis of moral motivation in the brain; psychological hedonism addressed briefly at the end.)
	Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (2008) Moral Psychology, 3 vols. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Massive collection of previously unpublished articles and replies from philosophers, psychologists, and others on the evolution, cognitive science and neuroscience of morality.)
	Sinnott-Armstrong, W., Young, L. and Cushman, F. (2010) ‘Moral Intuitions’, in J. M. Doris and the Moral Psychology Research Group (eds) The Moral Psychology Handbook, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 246–272. (Discusses the hypothesis that some moral intuitions are formed by heuristics just as certain nonmoral beliefs are, as in the work of psychologists such as Kahneman, Tversky and Gigerenzer.)
	Slote, M. A. (1964) ‘An Empirical Basis for Psychological Egoism’, Journal of Philosophy 61 (18): 530–537. (A philosopher’s defence of psychological egoism based on empirical work in psychology at the time, which was largely behaviouristic in nature.)
	Sober, E. and Wilson, D. S. (1998) Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior, Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University Press. (Argues that philosophical arguments and social psychology don’t provide sufficient evidence against psychological egoism, whereas evolutionary theory does.)
	Sripada, C (2010) ‘Philosophical Questions about the Nature of Willpower’, Philosophy Compass 5 (9): 793–805. (Brief and informative overview and synthesis of recent philosophical and empirical work on weakness and strength of will.)
	Stich, S., Doris, J. M.  and Roedder, E. (2010) ‘Altruism’, in J. M. Doris and the Moral Psychology Research Group (eds) The Moral Psychology Handbook, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 147–205. (An overview of the philosophical, biological, and psychological work relevant to the egoism–altruism debate. Much of the focus is on Sober and Wilson and Batson.)
	Wheatley, T. and Haidt, J. (2005) ‘Hypnotic Disgust Makes Moral Judgments More Severe’, Psychological Science 16: 780–784. (Provides evidence that disgust can make those highly susceptible to hypnosis provide harsher moral judgments about some hypothetical scenarios.)