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Moral psychology, empirical work in

DOI
10.4324/9780415249126-L147-1
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Published
2012
DOI: 10.4324/9780415249126-L147-1
Version: v1,  Published online: 2012
Retrieved March 28, 2024, from https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/moral-psychology-empirical-work-in/v-1

3. Moral judgment and motivation

Many of the issues dividing moral theorists rest on claims about how we come to judge things as right and wrong (see Moral judgment), as well as what motivates us to act in accordance with such judgments. Two intimately related issues in this arena are (a) the connection between moral judgment and motivation, and (b) the role of ‘reason’ in moral motivation.

Moral philosophers have long thought that there is an important connection between moral judgment and moral motivation. For example, if I believe I should accede to my friend’s request to take her to the airport, then I will at least typically have some motivation to do so. While perhaps I may lie in the end, claiming I have prior commitments, the ‘defeasible’ motivation is still there. Strong motivational internalists believe this connection is necessary: making a moral judgment necessarily entails having some corresponding motivation to act in accordance with it, even if it is ultimately overridden by something else, like self-interest (see Moral motivation §1).

This strong form of motivational internalism, however, can be challenged by reference to empirical evidence on our motivational capacities (Roskies 2003). Consider the famous Phineas Gage and other VM patients – those with so-called ‘acquired sociopathy’, studied at great length by Antonio Damasio (1994) and his collaborators. Often suffering from lesions in the ventromedial (VM) prefrontal cortex of the brain, these patients have varying deficits in their ability to feel certain emotions and engage in prosocial behaviour. Unlike psychopaths born with rather extreme antisocial tendencies (Nichols 2004: ch. 3), VM patients are arguably competent with moral terms and concepts, as evidenced by their typically high scores on Kohlberg’s moral reasoning tests, for example. Yet various studies of their reactions to moral stimuli, such as low skin-conductance responses and self-reports, indicate that they do not have the corresponding motivation to act in accordance with their moral judgments. If this is a correct description of their state of mind, VM patients are counterexamples to strong internalism: they make moral judgments but at least sometimes lack the corresponding motivation (see also Ethics and psychology §3; Sinnott-Armstrong 2008, vol. 3).

A related, though distinct, issue is the role of ‘reason’ in moral motivation – as in Hume’s famous dictum that reason is the ‘slave of the passions’ (see Hume, David §10). Assuming, in a rather stipulated manner, that the faculty of reason produces beliefs, contemporary philosophers address this perennial issue by focusing on what role beliefs can play in motivation. They focus in particular on normative or evaluative beliefs, such as beliefs about what one ought to do (see Moral motivation §3 and §7). Neo-Humean philosophers maintain that the only role for normative beliefs is to determine how to satisfy our antecedent desires. For example, suppose I believe that I ought to help my sister. According to the neo-Humean, the only role this belief can play in my motivation is to help satisfy an antecedent desire, and the only relevant desire seems to be this: the desire to do whatever I believe I should (e.g. Mele 2003: ch. 4). Those in the rationalist tradition, however, maintain that normative beliefs can generate a desire to act as they dictate, independent of any antecedent desire (e.g. Darwall 1983: esp. p. 39; Korsgaard 1986).

At least one relevant question here is causal: can normative beliefs in humans produce a desire without this serving or furthering some antecedent desire? Empirical research can help us answer such questions. One might suggest, for example, that the neo-Humean picture is best supported by what neuroscience tells us about the human brain (Schroeder et al. 2010). The brain’s ‘reward system’, after all, appears to be essential for normal motivation. Yet it also seems to be the seat of our ultimate desires, as it is involved in the kind of learning and pleasure associated with basic motivation (Morillo 1990; Schroeder 2004). Actions whose neural antecedents do bypass the reward centre and originate in higher cognitive structures, however, are not exactly the paradigms of morality: habitual acts and tics involved in Tourette’s syndrome, for example (Schroeder 2004: ch. 5.3). While such research into the neurophysiological realization of mental states is promising and suggestive, granting the forgoing claims only establishes that normal, non-pathological action must be preceded by desires – a claim which is often accepted on anti-Humean views (e.g. Darwall 1983). The crucial question for further empirical evidence to address is whether these desires must always precede normative beliefs.

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Citing this article:
May, Joshua. Moral judgment and motivation. Moral psychology, empirical work in, 2012, doi:10.4324/9780415249126-L147-1. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Taylor and Francis, https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/moral-psychology-empirical-work-in/v-1/sections/moral-judgment-and-motivation.
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