Baker, L. (2000) Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
(A detailed defence of the constitution theory as a general metaphysical view and as it applies to persons.)
Beck, S. (2014) ‘Transplant Thought-Experiments: Two Costly Mistakes in Discounting Them’, South African Journal of Philosophy, 33(2):189-199.
(A defense of the use of thought experiments in discussions of personal identity.)
Blatti, S. (2012) ‘A New Argument for Animalism', Analysis, 72: 685-690.
(An evolutionary argument for animalism.)
Carter, W.R. (1990) ‘Why Personal Identity is Animal Identity', Logos, 11: 71-81.
(An early defense of animalism.)
Davenport, J. (2012) Nattaive, Identity and Autonomy: from Macintyre to Kierkegaard, London: Routledge.
(A defence of narrative views of practical identity against their critics.)
DeGrazia, D. (2005) Human Identity and Bioethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
(A complex account of personal identity applied to problems in bioethics.)
Dennett, D. (1990) Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
(A naturalistic account of free will with a discussion of thought experiments.)
Dennett, D. (1992) ‘The Self as a Center of Narrative Gravity’, in Frank S.
Kessel, Pamela M.
Cole and Dale L.
Johnson (ed.) Self and Consciousness: Multiple Perspectives, Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 103–115.
(An empirically inspired narrative account of the self.)
Häggqvist, S. (2009) ‘A Model for Thought Experiments', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 39: 56-76.
(Presents a model for thought experiments that describes how they aspire to create knowledge and considers differences between the use of thought experiments in different contexts.)
Hershenov, D. (2005) ‘Do Dead Bodies Pose a Problem for Biological Approaches to Personal Identity?', Mind, 114: 31-59.
(An argument that animalism can withstand the argument from the ‘corpse problem’.)
Hudson, H. (2001) A Materialist Metaphysics of the Human Person, Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press.
(A fairly technical book that defends a view of the metaphysics of human persons according to which human persons are material objects but not human organisms.)
Johnston, M. (1997) ‘Human Concerns without Superlative Selves' in Jonathan Dancy (ed.) Reading Parfit, Oxford: Blackwell, 149-79.
(A defense of the view that our practices concerning persons do not rest on metaphysical facts.)
Korsgaard, C. (1989) 'Personal Identity and the Unity of Agency: A Kantian Reply to Parfit', Philosophy & Public Affairs
18 (2): 101–132.
(An original and important argument for defining personal identity in terms of agential unity.)
Lamarque, P. (2007) ‘On the Distance between Literary Narratives and Real-Life Narratives’, in Daniel
Hutto (ed.) Narrative and Understanding Persons, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 117–132.
(Argues that narrative theorists exaggerate the structural connections between life and literature.)
Lewis, D. (1976) ‘Survival and Identity’, in A. O.
Rorty (ed.) The Identities of Persons, Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 17–40.
(A fairly technical account of the four-dimensionalist response to the fission case.)
Lindemann, H. (2001) Damaged Identities, Narrative Repair, (as Hilde Lindemann Nelson) Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
(A view of identities as constituted by social narratives which can be damaged by oppressive master narratives and repaired by counternarratives.)
Lindemann, H. (2014) Holding and Letting Go: the Social Practice of Personal Identities, New York: Oxford University Press.
(An account of the narrative social practices through which identities are constituted and damaged.)
Lizza, John P. (2006) Persons, Humanity, and the Definition of Death, Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
(An argument against a strictly biological understanding of death that includes a constitution view of persons.)
Locke, J. (1689) An Essay concerning Human Understanding, ed.
Nidditch, Oxford: Clarendon Press,1975.
(II.xxvii contains the classic statement of the modern problem of personal identity and the original statement of central insights behind the psychological approach.)
MacIntyre, Alasdair (1984) After Virtue, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
(A reflection on the state of moral theorizing which includes a description of a person’s life as a narrative replete with meaning.)
Mackie, D. (1999a) 'Animalism vs. Lockeanism: No Contest', Philosophical Quarterly, 49: 369-376.
(Argues that animalism and Lockeanism are incompatible and that animalism is the superior view.)
Mackie, D. (1999b) 'Personal Identity and Dead People', Philosophical Studies, 95: 219-242.
(An argument that people can exist as corpses and that this has implications for the personal identity debate.)
Martin, R. and Barresi, J. (2003) Personal Identity, Malden, MA: Blackwell.
(An extremely useful collection of recent essays on personal identity.)
McMahan, J. (2002) The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life, New York: Oxford University Press.
(A meticulous argument for a minimalist account of identity and its application to difficult ethical problems.)
Noonan, H. (1989) Personal Identity, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul; 2nd edn 2003.
(An important survey of the major issues in the personal identity debate.)
Olson, E. (1997) The Human Animal: Personal Identity without Psychology, New York: Oxford University Press.
(A clear and well-argued defence of animalism.)
Olson, E. (1998) 'There is no Problem of the Self', Journal of Consciousness Studies, 5:645-57.
(An argument that the word ‘self’ is not used consistently, causes confusion in philosophical discourse, and should therefore be avoided in that context.)
Olson, E. (2007) What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology, New York: Oxford University Press.
(A consideration of various theories of what we most fundamentally are which looks at the strengths and weaknesses of each view.)
Parfit, D. (1984) Reasons and Persons, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
(A groundbreaking work that reviews the major positions in the personal-identity debate, offers radical new positions and explores their implications for ethics.)
Parfit, D. (2012) 'We are not Human Being', Philosophy , 87:5-28.
(A defence of Lockean accounts of personal identity against animalist objections using the view that persons are proper parts of human animals.)
Perry, J. (1972) ‘Can the Self Divide?’, Journal of Philosophy
69 (16): 463–488.
(A fairly technical response to the fission case.)
Perry, J. (1975) Personal Identity, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
(An important and useful collection of early papers in the personal-identity debate.)
Perry, J. (1976) ‘The Importance of Being Identical’, in A.
Rorty (ed.) The Identities of Persons, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
(A defence of the psychological approach against the argument that it cannot explain future-directed self-concern.)
Perry, J. (1978) A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality, Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company.
(An introduction to the personal-identity debate in dialogue form.)
Ricoeur, P. (1990) Soi-méme comme un autre, Paris: Éditions du Seuil; trans.
Blamey, Oneself as Another, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1992.
(A detailed hermeneutical narrative account.)
Rorty, A. (ed.) (1976) The Identities of Persons, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
(An important anthology of classic papers on personal identity.)
Rudd, A. (2012) Self, Value, and Narrative: A Kierkegaardian Approach, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
(A defence of the narrative view of self which makes use of insights from Kierkegaard.)
Rovane, C. (1998) The Bounds of Agency: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
(A revisionary account that defines identity in terms of the unity of a rational rather than phenomenological point of view.)
Schechtman, M. (1996) The Constitution of Selves, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
(Argues that the narrative approach is superior to the psychological continuity theory.)
Schechtman, M. (2014) Staying Alive: Personal Identity, Practical Concerns, and the Unity of a Life, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
(Agues for a view of persons as constituted by the unity of a characteristic kind of life that involves dynamic interaction between biological, psychological, and social features.)
Shoemaker, D. (2007) ‘Personal Identity and Practical Concerns’, Mind
116 (462): 317–357.
(An article exploring the complexity of the relations between personal identity and the practical.)
Shoemaker, S. (1984) ‘Personal Identity: A Materialist’s Account’, in S.
Shoemaker and R.
Swinburne (eds) Personal Identity, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 67–138.
(A defense of a version of the psychological approach.)
Shoemaker, S. (1984) ‘Persons, Animals, and Identity’, Synthese , 162:313-324.
(A defense of the psychological approach against animalist objections which develops a constitution view of identity and distinguishes between two different senses of ‘animal’.)
Snowdon, P. F. (1990) ‘Person, Animals, and Ourselves‘, in C. Gill (ed.) The Person and the Human Mind: Issues in Ancient and Modern Philosophy, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 83-107.
(A subtle early defense of animalism.)
Snowdon, P. F. (2014) Persons, Animals, Ourselves, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
(A thorough and forceful challenge to the intuitions that are taken to support psychological accounts of personal identity which claims that presumption should be given to animalism.)
Stokes, P. (2015) The Naked Self: Kierkegaard and Personal Identity, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
(A fascinating development of a contemporary narrative view using insights from Kierkegaard.)
Strawson, G. (2004) 'Against Narrativity', Ratio
17 (4): 428–452.
(A powerful attack on narrative views of self.)
Taylor, C. (1989) Sources of the Self, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
(A sweeping historical discussion of the notion of personal identity and defence of the hermeneutical narrative view.)
Unger, P. (1990) Identity, Consciousness, and Value, New York: Oxford University Press.
(A thoughtful and wide-ranging argument for a minimalist view of identity.)
Van Inwagen, P. (1990) Material Beings, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
(A metaphysical account of objects which includes a defense of animalism.)
Vice, S. (2003) 'Literature and the Narrative Self', Philosophy, Issue 1: 93-108.
(A spirited challenge to narrative accounts of identity which argues that narrative self-conceptions can be oppressive.)
Wilkes, K. (1988) Real People: Personal Identity without Thought Experiments, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
(A compelling argument against the use of science-fiction thought experiments in the investigation of personal identity.)
Williams, B. (1973) ‘The Self and the Future’, inProblems of the Self: Philosophical Papers 1956–1972, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
(A collection of original and thoughtful papers about self and identity.)
Wolf, S. (1986) 'Self-Interest and Interest in Selves', Ethics Vol. 96, No. 4, pp. 704-720.
(An argument that there are reasons to take a practical interest in persons even if Parfit’s reductionist view is true.)
Zahavi, D. (2007) ‘Self and other: The limits of narrative understanding’ in D. Hutto (ed.) Narrative and Understanding Persons, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 60, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 179-201.
(An argument that the narrative self depends upon a pre-existing minimal self whose existence is supported by both phenomenology and neuroscience.)