Propositional attitudes

DOI: 10.4324/9780415249126-V028-1
Version: v1,  Published online: 1998
Retrieved March 07, 2021, from

References and further reading

  • Braddon-Mitchell, D. and Jackson, F. (1996) The Philosophy of Mind and Cognition, Oxford: Blackwell.

    (Excellent, state-of-the-art textbook for philosophy of mind.)

  • Churchland, P. (1981) ‘Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes’, Journal of Philosophy 78: 67–90.

    (Well-known defence of a style of eliminativism about the propositional attitudes that sees propositional attitude talk as failed science.)

  • Davidson, D. (1968) ‘On Saying That’, Synthèse 19: 130–146.

    (Treatment of the contents of propositional attitude ascriptions in terms of sentences in English, but not as sentences of English.)

  • Fodor, J. (1975) The Language Of Thought, New York: Crowell

    (Defence of the hypothesis that there is a language of thought.)

  • Frege, G. (1917) ‘Thoughts’ in P. Geach (ed.) Logical Investigations, Oxford: Blackwell, 1977.

    (Famous defence of the view that the contents of propositional attitudes are abstract structured entities.)

  • Grice, P. (1957) ‘Meaning’, Philosophical Review 66: 377–388.

    (A classic. Includes famous analysis of meaning in terms of propositional attitudes.)

  • Harman, G. (1972) Thought, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

    (Early, clear, exposition of a functionalist account of the mind and, in particular, the propositional attitudes.)

  • Kripke, S. (1982) Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Oxford: Blackwell.

    (Classic text which deals, inter alia, with problems about the normativity of propositional attitude contents.)

  • Lewis, D. (1970) ‘How To Define Theoretical Terms’, Journal of Philosophy 67: 427–446.

    (Masterly treatment of the definition of theoretical terms. Much better – but much harder – than the outline in §5!)

  • Lewis, D. (1994) ‘Reduction of Mind’, in S. Guttenplan (ed.) A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431.

    (Superb exposition of Lewis’s philosophy of mind. Assumes some familiarity with the prior literature.)

  • Loar, B. (1981) Mind and Meaning, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    (Difficult, but very good, discussion of propositional attitudes, and their importance for philosophy of mind and philosophy of meaning.)

  • Pessin, A. (1995) The Twin Earth Chronicles, London: Pergamon Press.

    (Collection of articles about Twin Earth, broad and narrow content, and so on. Good reading list.)

  • Quine, W.V. (1960) Word and Object, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press and John Wiley.

    (Famous and elegant text which includes defence of a kind of eliminativism about propositional attitudes.)

  • Salmon, N. (1986) Frege’s Puzzle, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    (Defence of treatment of propositions as structured, set-theoretic entities.)

  • Salmon, N. and Soames, S. (1988) Propositions and Attitudes, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    (Excellent collection of papers about the semantics of propositional attitude ascriptions. Good reading list.)

  • Schiffer, S. (1972) Meaning, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

    (Defence of the view that propositional attitudes – in particular, belief and intention – are the key to meaning. Not easy going.)

  • Schiffer, S. (1987) Remnants of Meaning, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

  • Stalnaker, R. (1984) Inquiry, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    (Defence of the view that the contents of propositional attitudes are sets of possible worlds. Includes best available treatment of the objection that any such treatment makes the objects of the attitudes too coarse-grained.)

  • Stich, S. (1983) From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    (Case for eliminativism about belief, and other propositional attitudes. Interesting, and reasonably accessible.)

Citing this article:
Oppy, Graham. Bibliography. Propositional attitudes, 1998, doi:10.4324/9780415249126-V028-1. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Taylor and Francis,
Copyright © 1998-2021 Routledge.

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