Print
NEW
|

Subjectivism and Objectivism about moral rightness/wrongness

DOI
10.4324/9780415249126-L163-1
Published
2020
DOI: 10.4324/9780415249126-L163-1
Version: v1,  Published online: 2020
Retrieved April 22, 2021, from https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/subjectivism-and-objectivism-about-moral-rightness-wrongness/v-1

References and further reading

  • Bykvist, Krister (2009) ‘Objective versus Subjective Moral Oughts’, Uppsala Philosophical Studies 57: 39–65. (This offers a response (similar to that offered by Graham (2010)) to the Jackson-style anti-Objectivist argument.)

  • Graham, Peter A. (2010) ‘In Defense of Objectivism about Moral Obligation’, Ethics 121: 88–115. (This contains a response (similar to that offered by Bykvist (2009)) to the Jackson-style argument against Objectivism.)

  • Howard-Snyder, Frances (2005) ‘It’s the Thought that Counts’, Utilitas 17(3): 265–281. (This contains arguments against Objectivism and for Subjectivism.)

  • Jackson, Frank (1991) ‘Decision-Theoretic Consequentialism and the Nearest and Dearest Objection’, Ethics 101(3): 461–482. (This contains the famous Dr Jill thought experiment around which a powerful argument against Objectivism is based.)

  • Kiesewetter, Benjamin (2011) ‘“Ought” and the Perspective of the Agent’, Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 5(3): 1–24. (This offers another argument for Subjectivism about ‘ought’.)

  • Mason, Elinor (2013) ‘Objectivism and Prospectivism about Rightness’, Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 7(2): 1–22. (This contains an argument for Prospectivism about moral rightness/wrongness.)

  • Mason, Elinor (2019) Ways to be Blameworthy: Rightness, Wrongness, and Responsibility, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (This is a comprehensive, integrated approach to deontic notions such as rightness and wrongness, and their connections to moral responsibility.)

  • Prichard, H.A. (1932) Duty and Ignorance of Fact’. Reprinted in Moral Writings, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002, 84–101. (This is a classic defence of Belief Subjectivism.)

  • Ross, W.D. (1930) The Right and the Good, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (This is an articulation of Ross’s Objectivist moral theory, before he abandoned it for Belief Subjectivism.)

  • Ross, W.D. (1939) Foundations of Ethics, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (After defending Objectivism in The Right and the Good, Ross, under the influence of Prichard, came to embrace Belief Subjectivism and articulated his version of it in this book.)

  • Smith, Holly M. (2010) ‘The “Prospective View” of Obligation’, Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 5(1): 1–9. (This wages an attack on Zimmerman’s case for Prospectivism.)

  • Zimmerman, Michael J. (2008) Living with Uncertainty, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (This is a sustained defence of Prospectivism.)

  • Zimmerman, Michael J. (2014) Ignorance and Moral Obligation, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (A response to all of the objections to Prospectivism that were spawned by his Living with Uncertainty.)

Print
Citing this article:
Graham, Peter. Bibliography. Subjectivism and Objectivism about moral rightness/wrongness, 2020, doi:10.4324/9780415249126-L163-1. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Taylor and Francis, https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/subjectivism-and-objectivism-about-moral-rightness-wrongness/v-1/bibliography/subjectivism-and-objectivism-about-moral-rightness-wrongness-bib.
Copyright © 1998-2021 Routledge.