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Subjectivism and Objectivism about moral rightness/wrongness

DOI
10.4324/9780415249126-L163-1
Published
2020
DOI: 10.4324/9780415249126-L163-1
Version: v1,  Published online: 2020
Retrieved March 28, 2024, from https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/subjectivism-and-objectivism-about-moral-rightness-wrongness/v-1

Article Summary

There is a debate in normative ethics between Objectivists and Subjectivists about moral rightness/wrongness. Subjectivists maintain that the rightness/wrongness of an action is grounded in the subjective situation of the agent at the time of its performance, where the subjective situation of an agent just is how the world seems from her point of view. Depending on how an agent’s point of view is understood – either in terms of her beliefs about the world or in terms of her evidence about the world – Subjectivists can be grouped into Belief Subjectivists and Evidence Subjectivists. Objectivists maintain that the rightness/wrongness of an action is grounded in the agent’s objective situation, where the objective situation of an agent just is how the world actually is, independent of her beliefs or her evidence about it. There are various arguments for and against each of Objectivism and Subjectivism.

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Citing this article:
Graham, Peter. Subjectivism and Objectivism about moral rightness/wrongness, 2020, doi:10.4324/9780415249126-L163-1. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Taylor and Francis, https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/subjectivism-and-objectivism-about-moral-rightness-wrongness/v-1.
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