Truth, deflationary theories of

References and further reading

	Field, H. (1986) ‘The Deflationary Conception of Truth’, in G. MacDonald and C. Wright (eds) Fact, Science and Morality, Oxford: Blackwell. (An important attack on the Deflationary Thesis. Not for beginners.)
	Geyer, D.L. (1917) ‘The Relation of Truth to Tests’, Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 13: 626–633. (Contains the earliest statement of what today would be called a redundancy theory.)
	Grover, D.L., Camp, J.L., Jr and Belnap, N.D., Jr (1975) ‘A Prosentential Theory of Truth’, Philosophical Studies 27: 73–125. (Presentation of a prosentential theory of truth by its inventors.)
	Horwich, P. (1990) Truth, Oxford: Blackwell. (Along with Williams – see below – one of the most thorough and best-argued defences of the redundancy theory. Horwich, however, rejects the Gratuity Thesis and endorses a milder than usual version of the Deflationary Thesis.)
	Kirkham, R.L. (1992) Theories of Truth: A Critical Introduction, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (An introduction to theories of truth. Chapter 10 expands on the issues in this entry.)
	Körner, S. (1955) ‘Truth as a Predicate’, Analysis 15: 106–109. (A potent, early attack on what is now called deflationism before the latter became popular.)
	Price, H. (1988) Facts and the Function of Truth, Oxford: Blackwell. (Presents a Darwinian theory of truth ascriptions.)
	Ramsey, F.P. (1927) ‘Facts and Propositions’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society supplement to 7: 153–170. (The first statement of a redundancy theory to have a widespread impact.)
	Strawson, P.F. (1950) ‘Truth’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society supplement to 24: 129–156. (The classic statement of the performative theory of truth ascriptions.)
	Williams, C.J.F. (1976) What is Truth?, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Along with Horwich – see above – one of the most thorough and best-argued defences of what could fairly be called a redundancy theory.)