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DOI
10.4324/9780415249126-DC121-1
Published
2020
DOI: 10.4324/9780415249126-DC121-1
Version: v1,  Published online: 2020
Retrieved March 02, 2024, from https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/psychologism/v-1

2. Historical evolution of the Psychologismusstreit

The Psychologismusstreit has some unique features:

  1. It is not a linear and one-dimensional process, but is characterised by having different origins, motivations, and aspects with a relative degree of autonomy and different stages in each of them.

  2. There was no single Psychologismusstreit process, but a multiplicity of simultaneous and successive controversies, that even though they had thematic and temporal links, were either factually unconnected or only indirectly related.

  3. The Psychologismusstreit did not exist as a thetic-thematic unit with previously defined contenders, but rather the demarcation line between psychologism and anti-psychologism was permanently reformulated so that positions considered anti-psychologism in one period, become considered psychologism in another. If at first it is enough to accept the distinction act – content or the normative nature of logical laws (Herbart, 1816 [1882]: 127), after consideration, only one who accepts Platonism in some way (Bolzano, 1837: 76ff.; Lotze, 1874 [1912]: 505f.), or only one who denies the immanence principle (Frege, 1893: XIXf.), or only one who does the transcendental reduction (Husserl, 1925 [1962]: 287ff.; 1927–31 [1962]: 344ff.) is an anti-psychologist thinker.

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Citing this article:
Porta, Mario González. Historical evolution of the Psychologismusstreit. Psychologism, 2020, doi:10.4324/9780415249126-DC121-1. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Taylor and Francis, https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/psychologism/v-1/sections/historical-evolution-of-the-psychologismusstreit.
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