Print
DOI
10.4324/9780415249126-DC121-1
Published
2020
DOI: 10.4324/9780415249126-DC121-1
Version: v1,  Published online: 2020
Retrieved April 18, 2024, from https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/psychologism/v-1

2.1.3. Kant’s psychological interpretation

Transcendental post-speculative-idealism philosophy ‘returns’ to Kant and, in that sense, the question of his interpretation ends up being decisive for systematic options. For this reason, it is not surprising that the Psychologismusstreit was also closely linked to the question of Kant’s interpretation. Both, however, cannot be simply identified, but it is necessary to distinguish them from each other, as well as from the psychological method. It is possible to be ‘Kantian’, accept the psychological method, the psychological interpretation of Kant, and be a psychologist thinker (Beneke), or to be Kantian, deny the psychological method, deny the psychological interpretation of Kant, and combat psychologism (Cohen, Windelband), or to be a Kantian, deny the psychological method, accept the psychological reading of Kant, and combat psychologism (Herbart), or, finally, not be a Kantian, accept the psychological method and the psychological reading of Kant and combat psychologism (Brentano).

Print
Citing this article:
Porta, Mario González. Kant’s psychological interpretation. Psychologism, 2020, doi:10.4324/9780415249126-DC121-1. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Taylor and Francis, https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/psychologism/v-1/sections/kants-psychological-interpretation.
Copyright © 1998-2024 Routledge.